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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
THE LAW COMES TO CAMPUS: THE EVOLUTION AND CURRENT ROLE OF THE 
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL ON COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES 
Much has been written in the literature of higher education on the history and 
current role of presidents, provosts, and deans. However, higher education scholars have, 
for the most part ignored the role of institutional in-house attorneys on college and 
university campuses. Those who have written on the subject of institutional counsel have 
proffered the idea that in-house general counsel offices were established as a result of the 
increased regulation of higher education by state and federal governments, and litigation 
resulting from the faculty and student rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s. This 
project seeks to provide a detailed justification for the rationale for the proliferation of 
counsel offices, and to provide a base-line qualitative, interview-based approach to the 
current role of college and university attorneys. 
Using a historical, document based approach this dissertation provides a 
comprehensive exploration of the argument that the establishment and growth of offices 
of the general counsel on college and university campuses was rooted in litigation. This 
dissertation further builds on the notion that as colleges and universities became larger 
and more complex, federal and state governments increased regulatory and reporting 
demands and accountability on institutions.  
A second issue that this dissertation covers is the way in which modern day 
institutional counsel view their roles within a college or university. Using Oral History 
Methodology, three attorneys were interviewed about their perceptions of their roles. 
Based on those interviews, this dissertation proffers the idea that an institutional 
counsel’s view of his or her role is linked to the nature of the individual campus and its 
leadership, and the structure of the office in which the attorney works. This dissertation 
also puts the role of the institutional counsel into the context of institutional actors by 
comparing it with the role of the academic dean. 
In addition to showing that the role of the institutional counsel is institution 
dependent, the results of this project indicate that the role of the institutional general 
counsel is an area ripe for additional study. 
KEYWORDS: Institutional General Counsel, Institutional Governance, Legal History, 
Litigation, Regulation  
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In closing, and aligned with the learning for learning’s sake philosophy, it is my 
hope that as higher education becomes more interdisciplinary, people in general, and 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Project Introduction and Statement of the Problem 
When looking at the organizational structure of a college or university, there is a 
large corpus of scholarly research on the role of senior administrators in higher education. 
Much has been written on the roles of presidents, deans, department chairs, and, to some 
extent, student affairs vice presidents. However, little has been written on the role of the 
general counsel. If you look at many institutional organizational charts from the largest 
Association of American Universities institutions to many small liberal arts colleges, the 
general counsel is usually at the top, either reporting to the president or directly to the 
board of trustees (Amherst College, 2012; UNC, 2013b). General counsels and their 
subordinates work on diverse business issues such as employment issues, tax concerns, 
institutional liability, contracts, people-centered issues such as discrimination, and issues 
involving students and faculty (UNC, 2013a).  
Colleges and universities in the United States face significant legal problems on a 
daily basis. As noted in several articles, the student rights movement in the 1960s and 
1970s significantly increased both the volume and complexity of litigation colleges and 
universities faced (Bickel, 1974; Daane, 1985; Sensenbrenner, 1974). In addition, courts 
were quick to hold institutions accountable (Bickel, 1974; Daane, 1985; Sensenbrenner, 
1974). Colleges and universities also faced, and continue to face, a regulatory 
environment where both federal and state governments demand accountability (Ruger, 
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1997). It is within this environment that the importance of the institutional general 
counsel has grown (Ruger, 1997). 
Although general counsel offices are common on campuses and often impact 
issues important to higher education scholars, most of the literature that has been written 
on the office has been practitioner-based and directed toward attorneys (Beale, 1974; 
Bickel, 1974; Daane, 1985; Epstein, 1974; Orentlicher, 1975; Sensenbrenner, 1974). 
While this type of writing has, in some cases, asserted how general counsel’s offices 
originated, it has not presented a comprehensive explanation of both the origins of the 
college or university general counsel’s office and its modern day role.  
In addition to practitioner articles, three dissertations have looked at the role of 
general counsels (Geary, 1975; Ripps, 1980; Thompson, 1977). While these three 
projects provided useful information for the time, they are somewhat dated. These studies 
utilized surveys to glean information from practitioners about their duties. While survey 
methodology is effective at collecting a broad swath of data, the approach of this project 
seeks to take a more personal and less broad based approach.  This dissertation seeks to 
explore and to elaborate on some of the historical impetuses for the office of the general 
counsel mentioned in the literature and then expand on the literature and history to get a 
sense of how modern day counsel view their roles and how those perceived roles fit into 
the context of leadership on campus as a whole. 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
Three major monographs have influenced this dissertation’s approach to this 
topic. They are Laurence Veysey’s The Emergence of the American University (1965), 
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Rudolph’s The American College and University: A History (1962), and Cowley’s 
Presidents, Professors and Trustees (1980). These three books look at the development 
of the professional bureaucracy in the college and university context. They all theorize 
that increased competition among institutions for students and resources, and the actions 
institutions took to respond to that competition, led to both the need to standardize 
governance within higher education and the greater involvement of outside constituents 
(Cowley, 1980; Rudolph, 1962; Veysey, 1965).   
Laurence Veysey, in his The Emergence of the American University (1965), 
elaborated on the factors that combined to necessitate the establishment of a bureaucracy 
within colleges and universities. Veysey, throughout the second half of his text, attributed 
the bureaucratization of higher education to the growth of the demand for a college 
education, increased student interaction with institutions, formalized course requirements 
for degrees, the systemization of both academic and non-academic processes, faculty 
upheaval, and increased interactions between institutions and the public. The reaction of 
colleges and universities fostered a competitive environment between institutions 
centered on students, faculty, and later, resources. 
According to Veysey (1965), the twenty-year period between 1890 and 1910 was 
key for the standardization and bureaucratization of American institutions of higher 
education. Veysey termed this era the “new academic age” of strong presidents. Veysey 
highlighted Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University as a primary example of a 
strong president bringing about structural changes to his institution. By 1902, under 
Butler, Columbia had instituted a central Registrar’s Office, an Office of the Bursar and 
created a large Office of the President to manage University affairs (Veysey, 1965, p. 
3 
307). During this time, Butler and the presidents of other institutions significantly 
modified the relationships between institutions and their students. This was, in part, due 
to a significant increase in student numbers during the late-1800s and early-1900s. Prior 
to the early 20th century, programs of study, particularly for PhD programs, were not 
standardized within institutions (Veysey, 1965). In an effort to control students and to 
compete with peers, institutions like Columbia began to standardize their PhD programs. 
Requirements were set so students knew what to expect and faculty had an objective 
standard to review student progress. More importantly, PhD standards clearly articulated 
the relationship between the institution as an entity and the student. Academically, the 
early 20th century brought about the introduction of accrediting bodies (Veysey, 1965). 
These organizations were outside forces that impartially evaluated institutions based on 
set standards. Institutions had to present a unified front to accrediting bodies; internal 
strife could hurt an institution’s reputation. A centralized administrative structure allowed 
for continuity of message. 
As institutions continued to grow and become more prominent within their 
communities, it became important for any given college or university to consider how it 
was perceived by the public. In his book The American College and University: A 
History (1962), Frederick Rudolph noted that college and university presidents not only 
had to deal with their internal constituencies, they also had to deal with the general 
public, including, to a limited extent, the government. As Veysey noted, the university 
president was as much an administrator as he was a politician; he had to promise 
something to everyone to be successful (Veysey, 1965).  
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By 1910, the number of new institutions developing within the United States had 
declined and existing colleges and universities were faced with the need to compete with 
their peers for resources. This prompted the rise in prominence of two additional vital 
constituents: outside foundations/benefactors and alumni (Rudolph, 1962; Veysey, 1965). 
Both Veysey (1965) and Rudolph (1962) noted the increased involvement of foundations 
such as the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations. Veysey (1965), in particular, 
discussed that foundations were very hands-on in interviewing institutional 
representatives before appropriating funds. Similarly, alumni became more interested in 
how institutions functioned, particularly because they were being asked to contribute. 
The involvement of alumni, and later foundations, forced institutions to further develop a 
centralized administration that presented a consistent message, crafted a process for 
obtaining and utilizing resources, and helped other members of the community, (i.e. 
faculty) to work within the new reality of institutional competition for resources (Cowley, 
1980; Rudolph, 1962; Veysey, 1965). 
In the end, a clear articulation of Veysey, Rudolph, and Cowley’s theory is that 
due to the proliferation of colleges and universities, the competition for external 
resources necessitated the establishment of centralized bureaucracies within colleges and 
universities to effectively lobby and respond to the needs of those resources. This 
dissertation takes that theory one step further and argues that the government became a 
significant outside force with which institutions had to interact. This interaction was the 
result of increased regulation and a shift in the rationale courts used to sustain individual 
rights in the context of higher education. Government intervention forced and continues 
to force institutions to adapt to governmental priorities and policies. As a result, the 
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institutional in-house general counsel became an integral part of the established 
institutional bureaucracy.    
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research questions. The first of two research questions for this project focuses 
on the history of the office and seeks to expand on previous articles written about the 
college and university general counsel. In the literature on general counsel’s offices, other 
writers have asserted that litigation during the 1960s and 1970s and/or government 
regulation of institutions during the 1960, ‘70s, and ‘80s brought about the need for on 
campus legal offices (Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 1997; Sensenbrenner, 1974). While these 
authors have proffered this theory, none has provided an extensive illustration of the 
cases or regulations that could have brought about this shift. The most extensive 
treatment of this issue, in Ruger (1997), was only a few paragraphs long. The first 
question of this dissertation seeks to present a broad description of the regulatory and 
case law environment during the period from the 1960s to the 1980s in order to provide 
the first extensive exploration of the assertions made in the literature. This dissertation 
first asks: What examples can be offered to support previously made assertions that the 
impetus for the proliferation of in-house university counsel offices in the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s was, in part, the result of increased governmental regulation, and litigation?  
Within the context of the impetus for the establishment of general counsel offices 
on college and university campuses, the second question, and the question that will serve 
as the basis for the non-document based research, seeks to understand the role of the 
institutional counsel on the modern day campus. This section of this dissertation will be 
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answering the question: How do institutional counsels view their roles within the 
institutional bureaucracy?  
To elaborate even further on this question, the points of view of the interviewees 
will be placed into the context of leadership as a whole on campus by comparing the role 
of the general counsel as articulated by the attorneys, with literature on the role of 
academic deans. Both the position of a general counsel and that of a dean are senior level 
in most higher education institutions. In addition, literature on the history and role of 
deans in higher education is extensive (Dibden, 1968; Gould, 1964; Tucker & Bryan, 
2001; Wolverton, Gmelch, Montez, & Nies, 2001). By comparing and contrasting both 
the career path of deans, and the role and responsibilities of the dean’s office with those 
of the general counsel, the contours of the role and limitations of the general counsel 
become more evident. This delineation further expands on the literature on the general 
counsel cited in Chapter Two.     
Hypothesis. When this dissertation concludes, I believe that it will show that 
attorneys see their roles as advisers. That is the role emphasized in law school and in 
private practice (where most institutional counsel originate) (interviews, April, 2014). 
However, factors like longevity, familiarity with administrators on campus, and 
investment in the institution could erode the line between attorney/adviser and decision 
making administrator. It is also my belief that my research will ultimately find that there 
is a gray area between attorney as adviser and attorney as decision maker and that most 
institutional counsel find themselves within that middle ground.  
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Conclusion 
The importance of the general counsel cannot be overstated. Understanding the 
history and the role of the general counsel might force scholars to look at decisions made 
by presidents and boards differently. In addition, it may force scholars to acknowledge 
that the law and issues related to the law have a greater impact on university decisions 
than previously thought.  This research could help the university counsel legal 
community as well. An in-depth examination of the roots of the general counsel’s office 
and its current role can help current counsels understand what their roles could or should 
be within their institutions.  By understanding the roots of the position, this work might 
also help current boards of trustees or presidents/CEOs better manage institutional 
attorneys.  
This project is meant to be a general historical study of the currently perceived 
role of the in-house college and university attorney. To that end, following the literature 
review in Chapter Two and methodology review in Chapter Three, Chapter Four will take 
a document based, historical, exploratory view of how regulation and case law could 
have both served as impetuses for general counsel offices on campuses as proffered in the 
aforementioned literature. Chapter Five serves to link the discussion in Chapter Four to 
the present day by exploring, through the use of Oral History techniques, how current or 
recently retired university counsel view or viewed their roles within the college or 
university. Chapter Five also briefly explores how the counsel role fits into institutional 
notions of campus leadership and bureaucracy by comparing the counsel’s role with the 
role of the academic dean. This discussion is meant to help both college attorneys and the 
people with whom they work understand the scope and limitations of the general 
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counsel’s office. Finally, in Chapter Six this dissertation will conclude by reflecting on 
this project and offering some suggestions for further research. 
Before moving on to the substantive discussion of the research questions 
presented above, it is important to understand how others have approached the impetus 
for, and role of, the college or university general counsel. That discussion follows in the 
next chapter.     
9 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
The literature on the role of the general counsel is limited, with sporadic articles 
written over the course of the thirty years from the 1970s to the 2000s. In general, articles 
were written by practitioners looking to either share best practices or reflect on their years 
of service in general counsel roles. These articles touched on two issues: methods of 
obtaining legal advice, and the role a general counsel should take within an institution of 
higher education (Bickel, 1974; Daane, 1985; Orentlicher, 1975; Sensenbrenner, 1974; 
Thomas, 1998).  
Methods of Obtaining Legal Advice 
When discussing methods of obtaining legal counsel, Richard Sensenbrenner 
(1974), a former counsel for the California State University System, suggested that there 
were three ways of hiring attorneys: individual departments hiring attorneys to suit their 
immediate needs, an institution hiring outside counsel, or an institution hiring an in-house 
general counsel. While mentioning these three options, Sensenbrenner (1974) was clearly 
a proponent of an institution engaging in-house counsel and creating an internal pool of 
lawyers of varying specialties. In addition to controlling costs, he cited six primary 
advantages to in-house attorneys versus outside counsel.  
First, Sensenbrenner (1974) believed that a staff of in-house attorneys would be 
better suited to test one another’s conclusions and approaches to legal issues. A group of 
in-house counsel would also be able to focus and help one another focus on the large 
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amount of work they have to do. In asserting this point he implicitly suggested that 
attorneys in an outside firm might be able to move off and do other work rather than 
focus on the problems of the institution.  
Sensenbrenner (1974) endorsed the idea of a general counsel’s office being a 
brain trust of people with differing interests. He noted that an issue might arise every few 
years and that having people with varying expertise would serve the institution well in 
helping to solve those types of problems. Sensenbrenner’s next point went back to the 
idea of controlling costs. With an in-house law practice, institutions would only have to 
pay for legal research tools once. When hiring outside law firms, institutions, through the 
hourly rate they pay, are supporting each individual firm’s research abilities.  
Sensenbrenner’s (1974) last two points dealt with relationships with clients. On-
campus attorneys were just that, on campus. They were quickly available and accessible 
to clients. In addition, by working in the same environment, Sensenbrenner (1974) 
asserted that institutional attorneys were and are better able to understand the situations 
they face. In addition to a campus-based presence, a centralized counsel’s office also 
allows for consistency of advice, something Sensenbrenner said was key to viable 
institutional representation (Sensenbrenner, 1974). 
 Another former institutional counsel, J. Rufus Beale, writing in 1974, expanded 
on Sensenbrenner’s (1974) ideas about how institutions engage attorneys. To Beale the 
emergence of the need for colleges and university attorneys was directly rooted in the 
student rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Students, through lawsuits, challenged 
the social standards. Robert Bickel echoed this sentiment in an article he wrote around 
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the same time for Journal of Law and Education (1974). Both Bickel and Beale were 
counsels for institutions in the South. Beale served the University of Alabama System 
and Bickel served the University of Florida. The South, in particular, was a focal point of 
the student rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Like Sensenbrenner (1974), Beale (1974) presented the same perceived benefits 
of in-house counsels. However, Beale (1974) built on Sensenbrenner (1974) by 
suggesting three other methods of obtaining legal advice. Beale mentioned the idea of a 
trustee attorney. The concept behind this approach is that a member of the board of 
trustees would serve as the institutional attorney. This, according to Ruger (1997), was 
the primary means of obtaining legal advice prior to the 1960s. Additionally, in many 
cases an attorney trustee provided legal advice free of charge (Ruger, 1997). The 
rationale behind this approach focuses both on the individual’s familiarity with the 
institution, his or her standing with the community, and his or her position of respect 
within the board and senior administration. While viable in some situations, this 
individual would most likely have his/her own practice and might not be able to devote 
enough time to institutional issues (Beale, 1974). 
Another approach articulated by Beale (1974) was the idea of a law professor as 
institutional attorney. Beale (1974) indicated that this model might work for some 
institutions due to a law professor’s intellect, access to student researchers, and 
knowledge of higher education. While in theory this approach may have seemed 
workable, in reality law professors tended to be focused on their individual research and, 
unless on a clinical track, were not really interested in practicing. In addition, there might 
have been a conflict of interest with a faculty member working on a legal issue involving 
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his or her peer. Beale’s (1974) final method of obtaining legal advice, at least for 
public schools, was utilizing an attorney general’s office. Beale (1974) touted the 
viability of attorney general’s offices by saying that the attorney general speaks with 
authority and has the resources to provide strong legal and investigative services 
(Beale, 1974).  
While most of the authors of articles on the legal needs of college and universities 
discussed, and advocated for, in-house general counsels, there was one novel approach 
discussed in the literature (Beale, 1975; Bickel, 1974; Bickel, 1994; Daane, 1985; 
Epstein, 1974; Mosier & Mosier, 1989; Orentlicher, 1975; Sensenbrenner, 1974; Thomas 
1998). In an article for Planning for Higher Education in 1996, Michael Roster and Linda 
Woodward, both from the Office of the University Counsel at Stanford University, 
described the approach they took toward representing Stanford during a period of 
extreme budget cuts. Roster, who was the General Counsel, was told to cut $500,000 
from his budget and to end overruns of $300,000. Roster’s office had grown in staff size 
from thirteen in 1980 to twenty-six by 1993 (Roster & Woodward, 1996). Roster’s 
approach was to creatively outsource legal work. He solicited bids for flat rate fees from 
area law firms. Based on those bids and the firms’ areas of expertise, he chose 
representation. Among the requirements he had was that firms send people to work in 
Stanford’s offices. Attorneys were assigned Stanford phone numbers and e-mails. To the 
outside world they were in-house counsels except for the fact that they were paid by their 
individual firms. The office went down to six attorneys and shortly after this plan enacted 
saved the University $500,000 to $800,000 (Roster & Woodward, 1996). While 
Sensenbrenner and Bickel presented an either/or approach, Stanford’s initiative merges 
the two into a viable alternative to a purely in-house operation.  
13 
Role of the General Counsel 
The vast majority of the authors who wrote articles on the topic of the role of the 
university general counsel agreed that it was not an institutional attorney’s role to make 
or be intimately involved in policy making on campus (Bickel, 1974, 1994; Mosier & 
Mosier, 1989; Orentlicher, 1975; Sensenbrenner, 1974; Thomas, 1989). Mosier and 
Mosier (1989) further implied that sometimes institutions were at a disadvantage if they 
waited for institutional counsel to give an opinion: “attorneys are cautious, and this could 
limit innovative administrative action…Full legal review might result in suggestions that 
would be more administrative than legal and thus delay decisions” (p. 15). As Bickel 
(1974) noted, an attorney’s role is to prevent a legalistic approach to institutional decision 
making by leaving the decisions in the hands of the non-lawyer administrators (p. 78).  
The majority of authors who indicated that a counsel’s role was advisory stressed 
that a university general counsel should be a generalist (Beale, 1974; Bickel, 1974; 
Sensenbrenner, 1974). As a result, that individual has limited knowledge about many 
issues that impact college and university campuses. Attorneys, therefore, needed to rely 
on administrators with specific knowledge in their individual fields to help apply legal 
concepts (Sensenbrenner, 1974). 
While most of the authors advocated the attorney’s role as advisor, they did not 
advocate the attorney being passive. Most of the authors viewed the role of the attorney 
as being, in part, responsive to the needs of the campus. For example, as Daane (1985) 
noted, the role of an attorney on campus is also serving as a drafter of agreements for 
campus constituencies. In addition to responding to the needs of campus, Beale (1974), 
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Daane (1985), Mosier & Mosier (1989) and Sensenbrenner (1974), each espoused the 
idea of a college or university attorney as a “preventative practitioner.” The authors 
indicated that attorneys, rather than waiting for problems to come to them, should be 
proactive in reviewing university policies and procedures for potential legal pitfalls. 
Areas specifically cited included: layoffs, contracts, open records laws, campus police, 
student affairs, and collective bargaining (Sensenbrenner, 1974, p. 23). Attorneys were 
up-to-date on current law and had the analytical skills to apply that law to existing 
policies. It was at this point where the line between the role of the attorney as advisor and 
as decision maker could be crossed. Under the point of view espoused by the authors who 
believed that an attorney’s role was that of an advisor, the attorney, finding a problem 
with policies and procedures, would then take the issue to the person or persons 
responsible for the university function involved (Beale, 1974; Bickel, 1974; Daane, 1985; 
Sensenbrenner, 1974). While the attorney might have suggested an outcome or change, 
ultimately it would have been up to the client or constituent to implement any change. 
“Preventative law” allowed for the identification of problems by the attorney and for the 
remedying of problems by the unit leader with more experience in the direct issue (Beale, 
1974; Bickel, 1974; Daane, 1985; Sensenbrenner, 1974).  
Up to this point this section has explored what the components of a university 
counsel’s role should be in the eyes of the majority of the authors writing on the topic. 
The question remains: What would the ideal relationship between institutional lawyers 
and their clients look like?  In a commentary article in the Journal of Higher Education, 
Epstein (1974) explored how the interaction should (at least in his opinion) take place. At 
the time, Epstein was the Vice Chancellor and General Counsel of the California State 
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University System. When presented with an issue from an on-campus client, Epstein 
wrote that an effective institutional attorney should have presented advantages and 
disadvantages of one course of action or another, presented the degree of risk of the 
various options, and, as a whole, helped administrators make informed decisions 
(Epstein, 1974). At no point did Epstein indicate that attorneys should have made 
decisions on behalf of their clients. In fact, Epstein encouraged clients to challenge 
attorneys by asking good questions, and telling attorneys not to hedge answers (Epstein, 
1974). Similarly, Ruger (1997) stressed the importance of the attorney retaining his or her 
independence from campus machinations. “A campus counsel should not be just an 
administrator with a law degree. Independence from organizational pressure or intrigue is 
essential” (Ruger, 1997, p. 184). 
While university administrators were the individuals on campus most likely to 
interface with institutional attorneys, one author in particular stressed that a counsel’s 
role goes beyond the administration.  Herman Orentlicher, in a 1975 piece, argued that 
the role of the general counsel in providing advice should have been extended to 
supporting the faculty. Orentlicher (1975), while he was writing this piece, was a law 
professor at Emory University. Prior to that appointment he had been the first staff 
counsel for the American Association of University Professors. Orentlicher (1975) 
stressed that the counsel was the university counsel and as such had a responsibility to all 
university constituents. In addition to working toward protecting the administrative 
bodies of the institution, Orentlicher (1975) believed that the university counsel had a 
responsibility to provide advice to faculty because “such advice and assistance is cardinal 
to the very fulfillment of the college or university’s academic and intellectual endeavors 
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and goals” (Orentlicher, 1975, p. 515). While Orentlicher’s points were valid, he failed to 
delineate where the line between institutional counsel and personal counsel started and 
ended. One example he gave was of a situation where institutional counsel could defend a 
faculty member accused of slander (Orentlicher, 1975). Orentlicher was unclear whether 
the university counsel should have always represented a faculty member or only in a 
situation where the institution itself was a party.  An institutional counsel who 
represented a faculty member in a largely personal case would not be appropriate.    
While the authors agreed on the general role of the university counsel, the vast 
majority were silent on an important aspect of that role: to whom the attorney reports. In 
most institutions, a board of trustees is charged with setting broad policy expectations and 
goals for the institution (Sensenbrenner, 1974). Boards then rely on others (usually an 
institution’s president or CEO) to implement those policies (Sensenbrenner, 1974). As 
Sensenbrenner (1974) noted, the distinction between implementer and visionary is key. If 
a general counsel reported directly to the board of trustees, the expectation would be that 
the counsel directly implements the goals of the board. This, according to Sensenbrenner 
(1974), would place the counsel in the unappealing role of decision-maker. In an ideal 
situation a board of trustees would look to the president/CEO to enact the board’s agenda. 
The president/CEO would then have the support of the general counsel and the board 
would have one person to look to for policy implementation (Sensenbrenner, 1974). 
While the counsel might interact with the board, in line with Sensenbrenner’s view of the 
role of the general counsel, he or she is ultimately responsible to the president/CEO. It is 
at this point that my study picks up with the question: Where do counsels see themselves 
as fitting into the organizational structure of a higher education institution?  
17 
The next chapter discusses the methods used to further explore many of the 
assertions made in the existing literature. Chapter Four will, through a document based 
approach, elaborate on the argument made in the literature that the impetus for the 
proliferation of institutional counsel was the result of the student rights movement of the 
1960s and 1970s and increased governmental regulation in the period from 1960 to the 
1980s (Bickel, 1974; Ruger 1997; Sensenbrenner, 1974). Chapter Five serves to link the 
discussion in Chapter Four to the present day by exploring, how current or recently 
retired university counsel view or viewed their roles on campus. Chapter Five also 
explores how that role fit or fits into existing notions of institutional governance by 
comparing the role of the counsel with the role of the academic dean. Chapter Six 
concludes this discussion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Methodology 
The overarching purpose of this study is to help readers, whether inside or outside 
the higher education field, understand the evolution, current role, and context of the 
university counsel’s office on college and university campuses. To accomplish this goal, 
two main research issues guide this study.  The first is to provide a broad description of 
the regulatory environment of the 1960s, ‘70s, and early ‘80s, and the case law 
environment during the 1960s and 1970s in order to explain the assertions made in 
previous articles on the proliferation of general counsel’s offices on college and 
university campus (Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 1997; Sensenbrenner, 1974), while the second is 
to understand what the current role of the institutional counsel is within the context of the 
university hierarchy.  
While document-based work provided a significant amount of data to help 
understand why institutional counsel offices were established, to understand their current 
role required a different approach, namely, interviews. When deciding to interview 
individuals for qualitative research projects, researchers must determine what interview 
approach is the most appropriate (Creswell, 2008). In the case of this project, rather than 
take the traditional route of using either structured or unstructured interviews, I decided 
to take an Oral History approach as modified from Ritchie (2003). In addition to 
discussing the process and rationale behind the documentary approach, this chapter will 
also discuss the process and rationale behind applying Oral History methods to 
interviews. 
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The Nature and Process of Document and Oral History Based Research 
Unlike ethnography, which involves observations and interviews in the modern 
day, historical research is focused on the past (Gasman, 2010). In looking at the past, 
historical researchers are not just focused on people. Historical researchers are concerned 
with events, movements, institutions, and, of course, individuals (Cohen & Manion, 
1994). Most importantly, historical research seeks to link all of the aspects of the research 
in an attempt to answer the central questions on which the research is based (Creswell, 
2008). 
Methodologically speaking, historical research requires that researchers collect all 
possible data related to the topic, cull through the data organizing facts and themes in a 
clear way, and present the data in a logical fashion (Wise, Norberg, & Reitz, 1967). Once 
data is collected, the most logical means of presenting the data is chronologically, 
thematically, or a combination of the two (Borg & Gall, 1983). Choosing the organization 
of the presentation requires the researcher to ascertain the best match between the nature 
of the data, the research question(s), and the hypothesis. (Borg & Gall, 1983). 
As with most forms of qualitative data, historical research can be subjective. The 
researcher is both collecting and interpreting the data (Borg & Gall, 1983). The goal of a 
researcher should be, according to Wiserma (1996), to remain as trustworthy as possible 
in keeping with the data found. To do so, historians have to take the data and place it in 
the context of the era from which the data originated. To apply a modern day context to 
data from the past undermines the validity of the data involved (Edson, 1988). In 
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addition, as mentioned in Creswell (2008), researchers have to proactively watch to 
ensure that they are not applying their own personal bias to the data.  
Unlike purely scientific research where researchers run experiments and 
document results and, ultimately, conclusions, historians use both documents and Oral 
History as data (Kyvig & Marty, 2010). Evidence can take two forms: primary and 
secondary sources. Primary sources are firsthand accounts, either written or oral, as well 
as documents originating during the time period being explored (Kyvig & Marty, 2010). 
Examples include: journals, interviews with people involved, documented first-hand 
experiences, documents from the period, etc. For the purposes of this study, journal 
articles from the period in question, interviews, legislation, and court cases were used as 
primary sources data (Kyvig & Marty, 2010). Secondary sources are second-hand oral or 
written accounts and post-event analysis by others. It is important to note, as Wiersma 
(1996) does, that second-hand accounts written near the time in question are more 
reliable than accounts or analysis written long after the time period. For the purposes of 
this study, many journal articles written during the time period were examined. While 
these documents were considered secondary sources at the time they were written, today 
they could be considered primary sources due to their being written close to the time 
period being studied and their direct link to both the topic being studied and the purpose 
that these documents serve within this study (Kyvig & Marty, 2010). 
In addition to Wiersma’s caution, Kyvig & Marty (2010) note, “the utility and 
reliability of documents vary nearly as much as their form. The circumstances of 
creation, intended purpose, and preservation all influence historic value” (p. 61). When 
looking at any historical evidence, in particular documentary evidence, a researcher must 
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be leery of the source. Kyvig & Marty (2010) encourage the researcher to ask questions 
to him/herself about the nature of the document, the person doing the writing, the purpose 
of the document, when the document was created, and the version of the document (p. 
62).  
 The same cautious approach needs to be taken toward Oral History. For the 
purpose of this project, Oral History will be defined as the spoken recollections of 
individuals recorded through an interview (Ritchie, 2003). In general, according to 
Ritchie (2003), an Oral History consists of a prepared interviewer questioning an 
interviewee, often times with open-ended questions, and recording his or her responses 
via video or audio. Oral History, as both Ritchie (2003) and Kyvig & Marty (2010) 
caution, is very much focused on the interviewee’s perspective of history. A researcher 
must keep in mind potential bias of the interviewee when analyzing the data.  
 While bias is a potential problem with Oral History, historical interviews allow 
researchers to document the stories and recollection of individuals who might not have 
the desire or ability to document their experiences (Ritchie, 2003). Lawyers, however, 
tend to not be overly open to sharing their experiences. In law school, it is stressed that 
the attorney/client privilege is sacrosanct. Therefore, it is rare for an attorney not in a 
significant public role to take the initiative to proactively reflect on his/her previous role. 
An Oral History interview with targeted questions is a way to encourage attorneys to 
provide insight into their practice.   
 The challenge with Oral History is that the process is not a passive one (Ritchie, 
2003). Prior to interviews, researchers have to do thorough background research to 
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become familiar with the context in which the interviewee’s knowledge is based. Oral 
historians tend to find that the older the interview subject is, the less likely he or she is 
able to recall specific dates or experiences. Prior research on the part of the researcher 
helps the interviewer fill in some of the gaps in the interviewee’s memory (Ritchie, 
2003). An example of this concept would be Douglas Boyd’s 2011 book Crawfish 
Bottom. While based on a topic unrelated to this dissertation, Boyd’s book was 
thoroughly researched and he used that research to both frame and apply the recollections 
of his interviewees to the story he told. Oral History interviews are both about the 
information gleaned from the interviewee but also that person’s interpretation of those 
events. The interviewee lived in the period and was in a far better position to understand 
the implications and context of the memories than the interviewer.  It is the responsibility 
of the researcher to place those interpretations and contextual insights into the broader 
historical narrative (Ritchie, 2003). 
Oral History, combined with the document-based analysis discussed, allowed me 
to provide a far more comprehensive and nuanced approach to the issue of the impetus 
for general counsel’s offices and their current roles on college and university campuses. 
Documents, and the information drawn from close readings of those documents, cannot 
substitute for the human experience (Ritchie, 2003). By combining these two methods of 
historical research, the goal of this project was to expand upon points made in the 
literature and introduce some new insights to help compliment assertions made in the 
past. In the next section, I will discuss the procedure undertaken to better understand the 
impetuses for the establishment a general counsel’s office on college and university 
campuses and their current roles on those campuses. 
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Procedure and Data Analysis 
Document-based material. Much of the existing literature on the topic of the 
creation of college and university legal counsel’s offices focuses on the recognition by 
the courts of student and faculty rights during the 1960s and 1970s (Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 
1997; Sensenbrenner, 1974). While case law was a major force behind the establishment 
of those offices, greater regulation on the part of federal and state governments in the 
period from the 1960s to the 1980s also contributed significantly to the need for in-house 
lawyers (Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 1997; Sensenbrenner, 1974). Fundamental to this project 
was the ability to find and use specific examples within both of these focuses in order to 
devise a comprehensive explanation of the impetus for the counsel’s office. The 
procedure for the document-based aspect of this project substantially mirrored that used 
in a previous dissertation that looked at the establishment of another office on a 
university campus (Stepp, 1999). In addition, it followed the basic principles for 
document based research outlined in Linda Eisenmann’s chapter in The History of U.S. 
Higher Education: Methods for Understanding the Past, edited by Marybeth Gasman 
(2010, p. 60). 
The process of formulating a cogent argument to support the assertions made by 
Ruger (1997) based on governmental regulation for the impetus for the university 
counsel’s office was approached in a systematic way. Writing about a project she 
undertook on the history of women’s education in the United States, Linda Eisenmann 
wrote, “after honing the list and reading the submissions of 100 different authors, I 
worked to portray the larger picture…looking at the individual entries and seeing their 
relationships across the timeline shows me how women had initially searched for 
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education wherever they could find it” (Eisenmann, 2010, p. 60). In essence this project 
took the same approach. A large number of articles and cases were read and categorized 
eventually yielding a viable explanation for assertions made in Bickel (1974), Ruger 
(1997), and Sensenbrenner, (1974).  
To start the process outlined by Eisenmann (2010) above, germane articles were 
sought using scholarly databases such as JSTOR and ERIC. Articles that dealt with the 
initiation of, modification of, or impact of regulatory schemes were considered germane. 
Specifically, pieces written from the 1960s to the present that focused primarily on the 
time period from the 1960s to the 1980s were pulled. This time period was selected based 
on the timeline presented in the literature (Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 1997; Sensenbrenner, 
1974). 
During the document gathering phase, articles were pulled by noted authors on 
the issue of the regulation of higher education. Those authors included Lawrence 
Gladieux, Michael Olivas, Robert Berdahl, and Aims McGuinness. After finding almost 
30 articles by these authors, each one was read to determine which articles addressed 
issues of regulation. Some were not relevant to the topic. Michael Olivas, for example, 
does not exclusively write on the issue of regulation. After a first reading of all of the 
articles, they were placed in chronological order for a second reading and coding. The 
rationale behind the chronological ordering was to see if a progression in the content and 
quantity of regulation existed (Eisenmann, 2010). In addition, reading the articles in a 
chronological manner, oldest to newest, allowed me to see how the issues the authors 
addressed were interconnected. Certain authors, i.e. Gladieux, limited themselves to 
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writing about certain topics. Chronological reading versus reading all of one author’s 
material at one time facilitated the finding of linkages between the articles.  
The articles themselves focused on various topics such as federal financial aid 
policy, federal research policy, state funding issues, etc. During the second reading, the 
articles were coded by paragraph using codes based on the overarching themes and how 
they related to the issue of regulations increasing the need for attorneys on campus. The 
analysis of text utilized in this study falls within the methodology known as content 
analysis. Weber (1990) defined content analysis as “a research method that uses a set of 
procedures to make valid inferences from the text” (p. 9). He also offered the view that in 
order to use content analysis, a researcher must define the recording unit to be recorded. 
Weber (1990) offered six options including: words, word sense, sentence, theme, 
paragraph, and whole text. As previously mentioned, because I was looking for themes 
within the broader issue of regulations that brought about the need for general counsel’s 
offices, I took a thematic, paragraph based approach to the articles studied. Since my goal 
was to present the data in a systematic and thematic way, this approach seemed the most 
logical.  While Weber (1990) indicated that word or sentence coding is more effective, 
the goal of the coding in the case of this project was to find similarities in articles on 
regulations with often significantly differing goals, subject matter, and sources. Due to 
these differences the language and terms used in the regulations, and the articles on those 
regulations, coding for words or sentences would not have been effective. In addition, 
because the question governing this aspect of the research was broad, the coding unit had 
to be broad as well to create data which could be categorized and analyzed. This is why 
thematic coding was utilized. In addition, according to Weber (1990), analyzing text for 
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themes helps the researcher understand, in-depth, the interactions between the perceiver 
of an action and the target of the action. This distinction is important in looking at 
relations between the governmental entities and college and university campuses.  
Complementing the broad use of thematic analysis, paragraph analysis allowed for the 
coding of larger sequences of text. Given how legal articles are often written, paragraph 
and thematic analysis allowed for the most efficient use of time given that computer 
assistance was not be available for this project (Weber, 1990).  
After the second reading, there were five different themes within the various 
articles; specifically they were: access, changing national interests, diversity, changing 
federal government interests, and state issues. At this point in my research, I realized that 
these themes were too specific. My goal was to draft an overview of examples of how 
regulations could have contributed to the need for in-house counsel offices on college and 
university campuses. To accomplish this goal, the categories needed to be broader. To 
that end, rather than look for thematic differences to further distill the different 
regulations, I looked for commonalities between them and, because this is a historical 
project, commonalities between the historical contexts of the regulations. I did this by 
finding commonalities between my codes, as suggested by Weber (1990). This approach 
helped to create two broad categories of regulations: federal regulations and state 
regulations. There was, however, one additional nuance. Within the context of federal 
regulations there were two different historical contexts: regulations initiated by the 
federal government, and regulations initiated by institutions and instituted by the federal 
government. This forced me to change my coding scheme which ultimately resulted in 
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three broad themes which became the headings in the following chapter: federal initiated 
regulations, institution supported regulations, and finally, state initiated regulations.  
The same process was undertaken when looking at case law as an impetus to the 
establishment of general counsel offices on college and university campuses. Instead of 
consulting articles, I culled through case decisions. Normally when an attorney marshals 
cases to cite in a brief to a court, he or she looks to the persuasive value and authority of a 
case (Statsky & Wernet, 1995). The authority and value of a case is based primarily on 
the court that issued the opinion (Statsky & Wernet, 1995). When talking about both 
national and state issues, US Supreme Court cases carry the most weight followed by US 
Circuit Courts of Appeals cases (generally Circuit Court opinions apply to the circuit in 
which they originate) (Statsky & Wernet, 1995). On state issues, the federal courts trump 
state courts; however, if a federal court has not intervened, state supreme court rulings 
have the most weight, followed by state appellate court decisions. Cases that present 
precedent that a court must follow are termed mandatory authority (Statsky & Wernet, 
1995, p. 161). Mandatory authority comes from the higher state appellate court (including 
the state supreme court), federal courts (in the area), or the US Supreme Court.  Cases 
which help an attorney prove his or her point but which are not mandatory authority are 
termed persuasive authority (Statsky & Wernet , 1995). Since I was exploring in greater 
detail the topic of the impetus for general counsel’s offices using a pre-set date range and 
specific themes to look for, I looked for cases that exemplified those themes as opposed 
to cases which would support a specific assertion in a specific court venue. For example, 
a case from a circuit court of appeals on the issue of faculty free speech from 1965 would 
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have been of more value to this project than a U.S. Supreme Court case from 1995 on the 
same topic.   
The distinction mentioned above is important to note. This part of the project is 
putting legal decisions in a historical context. If this project were to fall under the 
standard definition of legal research, I would have been forced to limit myself to the law 
that controls at the time, i.e. the most recent opinion dealing with my issue (Statsky & 
Wernet , 1995). Because I was looking for historical trends in the law, as represented by 
case law, I worked with a hybrid approach. It was at this point that I ran into difficulty. 
Initially, I used legal principles to gauge the applicability of a case. In essence I 
conducted legal analysis of historical cases as opposed to historical analysis of legal cases 
(Olivas, 2013). Legal analysis of historical issues seeks to take cases from the past and 
explore how courts or governments interpreted those issues over time. As Scott Gelber 
(2014c) notes in a forthcoming book, historical analysis pays far more attention to the 
context of the laws, court decisions, and/or regulations and how those laws, court 
opinions, and/or regulations complemented or contradicted the broader societal trends of 
any given time period, i.e. the outcomes of legal cases or deliberations over regulation. 
Legal analysis is far more focused on the text of a case and why courts made the 
decisions they did. In his 2013 book, Suing Alma Mater, Michael Olivas, who is both a 
trained attorney and historian, goes so far as to indicate that he would not usually quote a 
significant amount of legal text in an historical volume (p. 91). If his text were intended 
for a more law based audience, he might not have been as terse with the legal analysis. 
Within this context and theoretical approach I explored historical texts by Thelin 
(2011), Gelber (2014a; 2014b; 2014c), and Geiger (2004), to set the historical scene on 
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campuses and in society. Specifically I focused on the rise of the recognition and 
importance of Constitutional and civil rights. I then placed specific cases against colleges 
and universities from the 1960s and 1970s in the context of society and the societal forces 
of the time. The ultimate goal was to show that the confluence of societal changes and 
changes in the interpretation of the law necessitated that colleges and universities 
establish in-house counsel offices on campus.  
As noted in Chapter Two, articles by practitioners proffered the idea that the 
student rights and faculty rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s helped solidify the 
need for institutional in-house counsel (Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 1997; Sensenbrenner, 1974). 
I began my search for cases with case books written about higher education law. Because 
they usually contain both state and federal cases, case books are usually an efficient 
starting point for topical legal research. I chose to use the three major case books on 
higher education law: Judith Areen’s (2008) Higher Education and the Law, Cases, and 
Materials; Michael Olivas’ (2006) The Law and Higher Education: Cases and Materials 
on Colleges in Court; and Daniel, Gee, Pauken, and Sun’s (2012) Law, Policy and 
Higher Education. These texts were comprehensive in their coverage and provided 
excellent examples of cases from the entire twentieth century. I chose to stop my research 
for cases after reviewing these books because I found a significant amount of overlap in 
the cases each author or set of authors chose to include. In addition, I found that if an 
issue was given a limited treatment in one book, a different text addressed the issue in far 
more detail. Based on my experience and the opinion of authors like Kyvig & Marty 
(2010) when duplicate information is found in multiple resources that often signals that 
material collection can stop and analysis can begin. 
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While both the analysis of regulatory issues and case law issues were meant to 
provide an extensive explanation of assertions made in the literature concerning the 
impetus for the establishment of general counsel offices, there was a slight, but important, 
difference in the nature of how that information had to be presented. This nuance 
impacted the methodology used for analyzing the case law. 
When presenting the regulatory information, the goal was to show the significant 
increase in the amount and type of regulations governmental bodies were placing on 
institutions of higher education. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the goal of the 
case law section was not just to present an increase in volume of litigation as the rationale 
for the need for campus counsel, but more importantly to show that a change in the nature 
of the legal analysis by courts brought about the need for institutional counsel. The 
application of law to institutions of higher education by courts had far deeper roots in 
history than the regulation of higher education by federal and state governments. As a 
result, the frame of analysis used to analyze cases had to recognize that difference in 
order to effectively present a potential rationale for the assertions made concerning the 
impetus for general counsel offices. 
In a similar manner to the approach taken for exploring increased regulations 
above, the first step in the coding process was to review all cases in all three casebooks 
that related to student or faculty rights issues during the time period proffered by Bickel 
(1974), Ruger (1997), and Sensenbrenner (1974). After reading the cases to ensure that 
they dealt with the issue of student or faculty rights, the cases were divided into the broad 
categories of cases involving faculty, and cases involving students. They were also 
ordered chronologically in an attempt to show a progression of reasoning by courts. The 
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rationale for this process was the same as the rationale for the ordering of the regulations 
(Eisenmann, 2010). 
The initial approach to the issue of case law was that the need for in-house 
general counsel was rooted in an increase in the volume of cases against colleges and 
universities during the 1960s and 1970s. However, scholarship by Scott Gelber in the 
field of the legal history of higher education (Gelber, 2014a; 2014b; 2014c) indicated that 
litigation was not new to higher education. Colleges and universities faced court 
challenges dating back to the 19th century. Therefore, the novelty of volume argument 
presented in the forthcoming regulatory section was analogous to case law to a point. 
What was significantly new regarding case law in the 1960s and 1970s was the law 
courts used when examining issues related to faculty and student rights. It was within this 
context that I applied a coding scheme to the cases. 
To analyze the cases, I applied a paragraph based, thematic content analysis 
(Weber, 1990) approach to the case law. The codes primarily focused on the rationale 
used by courts to decide cases. Here again, paragraph based, thematic coding was chosen 
due to the differing topics of the cases resulting in differing language which would have 
been difficult to code and analyze on the sentence or word level. As cases were read and 
coded, the coding analysis resulted in the understanding that the courts’ decisions were 
based on Constitutional Due Process or Equal Protection standards. The initial themes 
were, like in the case of the regulations, overly complex. Specifically, under the faculty 
rights heading, thematic categories included the limiting of institutional authority in the 
areas of: academic freedom, procedural due process, and financial issues. On the student 
rights side, thematic categories included the limiting of institutional authority in the areas 
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of: First Amendment free speech, Fourteenth Amendment due process, and Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure. Because the goal of Chapter Four was to explain the 
historical shift in what laws courts applied to disputes between institutions and faculty or 
students, I decided the use of these themes was too cumbersome and more legalistic in 
nature than was appropriate. Therefore, I reduced the complexity of the themes by 
categorizing the language of the cases based solely on the constituency they impacted 
(Eisenmann, 2010). 
 Based on the coding scheme outlined above, articles by Gelber (2014a; 2014b; 
2014c), and the question this part of this dissertation is working toward answering, I 
constructed a narrative of this evolution in court analysis. It should be noted that cases 
were chosen for analysis and cited in Chapter Four because they dealt with issues related 
to faculty or student rights as cited in the literature (Bickel, 1974; Ruger 1997; 
Sensenbrenner, 1974). The goal was to present the application of Constitutional rationale 
to cases involving higher education as a potential explanation of the proliferation of 
general counsel offices, not to present a legal argument. Therefore, cases from many 
different levels of courts from the US Supreme Court to state trial courts were integrated 
into the discussion. Legal trends were and are not always set by the US Supreme Court. 
Often, lower courts set standards which are never reviewed by state or federal 
intermediate appellate or supreme courts. Cases were ultimately cited based on their 
ability to move the historical narrative forward by either providing additional context or 
an additional nuance to the analysis.    
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Rationale for document-based research. While the underlying theoretical 
framework for this project is rooted in the history of the bureaucratization of higher 
education in the United States, specific notions about the evolution of the general 
counsel’s office come from articles written during a period of significant growth of these 
offices on college campuses (Beale, 1974; Bickel, 1974; Daane, 1985; Epstein, 1974; 
Orentlicher, 1975; Sensenbrenner, 1974). Primary sources are sources of information that 
are the closest in time to the period of issue being studied (Kyvig & Marty, 2010). In the 
case of the research issues presented in this study, the basic notions that the proliferation 
of general counsel’s offices came from an increase in regulation and more activist courts 
is rooted in articles written by practitioners in the 1960s and 1970s. This was the period 
of time during which the proliferation was at its height. Therefore, as discussed earlier, 
these articles could be considered primary sources because they were written during the 
time frame in question (Kyvig & Marty, 2010). One would think that the relatively recent 
(at least in terms of history) age of the articles would lend themselves to other forms of 
data collection rather than document based study, i.e., interviews with the authors. 
However, one must realize that the authors of these articles, for example, Sensenbrenner 
(1974), were late-middle-aged when they wrote their pieces. Many of the authors have 
subsequently passed away in the years between the publishing of their articles and today. 
As a result, all we have is their writings and secondary documents that complement their 
assertions. This is part of the rationale for basing part of the research on looking at 
historical documents. 
The second rationale for document based research centered on the data itself. In 
the first part of the analysis, I expanded upon the assertions of the practitioner/authors. 
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The only effective and efficient way to do this was through a comprehensive review of 
regulations and case law directed toward higher education during approximate time 
period those articles cited. State and federal governments routinely propose and either 
enact or reject regulations. Obtaining the texts of all proposed and/or enacted regulations 
over the course of thirty to forty years and then analyzing those laws or regulations would 
have been a daunting task. This is, in part, why I used articles from the period that 
analyzed changes and trends in regulations.  It is important to note that although the 
documents I consulted were considered secondary sources at the time of their publishing, 
now they could be considered primary sources due to their age and the nature of the 
material they cover (Kyvig & Marty, 2010).  
Oral History. It is commonly known that attorneys, unless they are in a high 
profile case, tend to keep the details of their clients’ matters to themselves. This secrecy 
is not an unspoken aspect of the legal profession. The practice of law is governed by 
strict rules based on a code of ethics promulgated by the American Bar Association 
(ABA) and adopted by states and state courts. Rule 1.6(b) of The ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (2013) explicitly states “a lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the 
disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the 
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”  As a result, it is very difficult to get 
practicing attorneys to talk about their current practice and cases. 
Previous studies from the 1970s and 1980s have looked at the role of the 
institutional counsel through a quantitative lens (Geary, 1975; Ripps, 1980; Thompson, 
1977). Despite an extensive literature search, it seems that there has never been a 
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historically qualitative approach taken toward this issue. The purpose of the interview 
portion of this project was to fill in that gap and understand how attorneys view or 
viewed their roles as general counsel or associate general counsel for institutions of 
higher education from an anecdotal perspective. Oral History provided the best method of 
obtaining personal recollections (Ritchie, 2003). The Oral History method mandates 
open-ended questions that allow the interviewee to explain issues fully (Perks & 
Thomson, 2006; Ritchie, 2003). Oral History methodology is designed to elicit the 
unbiased recollections of the interview subject in a detailed way (Perks & Thomson, 
2006; Ritchie, 2003). Closed ended questions would undermine this goal by cutting off a 
subject’s ability to elaborate on issues. In addition, closed ended questions create the 
opportunity for more interviewer bias to show (Ritchie, 2003).  
In order to start the Oral History aspect of this project, I had to first gain an 
exemption from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Kentucky 
(UK). To obtain the exemption I had to submit a copy of the questions being asked, the 
letter of introduction, and the informed consent along with the necessary application. Oral 
History qualifies for an exemption because it deals with issues from the past, i.e. already 
existing data, and has been deemed, at least by University of Kentucky’s IRB, as at low 
risk for harming the interviewee (UK, 2014). After a short wait, I received permission to 
begin. 
The concept of Oral History evokes many different definitions. For the purposes 
of this project, the definition of Oral History drew upon a definition rooted in Ritchie 
(2003): a collection of spoken memories and personal commentaries and insights of 
historical significance recorded through interviews. These interviews generally consist of 
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a prepared interviewer questioning an interviewee and recording their exchange. It is 
important to note from the outset that an Oral History interview is different from a 
standard qualitative interview. A well-done Oral History interview, according to Ritchie 
(2003), provides the opportunity for the interviewee to elaborate on experiences in a 
detailed way. This requires the interviewer to prepare well thought out open-ended 
questions that do not require a significant amount of follow-up on the part of the 
interviewer. In addition, the interviewer must be an active listener and, if necessary, 
provide prompts to allow the interviewee to elaborate. These prompts must be used 
sparingly (Ritchie, 2003).  
While Oral History seeks to record the memories and insight of individuals, the 
nature of memory does not lend itself to exact fact and figures. For that reason, it is 
important for the interviewer to be well-versed in the topic being discussed (Perks & 
Thomson, 2006; Ritchie, 2003). As established in the previous section, I have read the 
literature and case law surrounding the impetuses for the establishment of the general 
counsel’s offices. In addition, having attended law school and practiced to a limited 
extent in two higher education environments, I am familiar with the language any 
interview subject might use. Once subjects were identified, I researched the individual’s 
career and familiarized myself with any significant challenges or issues he or she faced 
while in the general counsel role. As Ritchie (2003) emphasizes, and as examples in 
Perks & Thomson (2006) show, an Oral History interview is only as productive as the 
interviewer is prepared. 
The interview aspect of this dissertation was meant to be an exploratory, initial 
look at how institutional attorneys viewed their roles, a topic that, to this point, has never 
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been studied in this manner, and how they viewed their roles in the context of other 
university professionals such as deans. To that end, I used a convenience sample to find 
participants (Creswell, 2007). As will be explained in Chapter Five, two of the attorneys I 
interviewed are currently practicing attorneys either for an institution or for a higher 
education system. They were selected based on my personal contacts who provided an 
introduction. Their proximity to my location was also a consideration. The third attorney, 
a retired general counsel, was interviewed following a call for participants issued by a 
member of my committee to institutional counsel within his professional network. This 
interview was conducted via Skype. I also sent four e-mails to some other local general 
counsels who never responded. Of the seven solicitations only the three individuals chose 
to participate. All three were instances where an introduction was provided by a third 
party. Because the approach to these interviews was qualitative, generalized conclusions 
could not be made (Creswell, 2007, 2008). The goal of these interviews was, as is the 
case with Oral History, to obtain anecdotes and information that told a story and 
represented the views of the individuals being interviewed (Perks & Thomson, 2006; 
Ritchie, 2003). Because this dissertation is dealing with individual histories, a large 
number of interviewees were not necessary (Ritchie, 2003). In addition, because a large 
number of interviewees were not required to achieve an initial sense of practitioner views 
on the role of the general counsel, a convenience sample method was sufficient 
(Creswell, 2007). Had this project been designed to be larger in scale, a more systematic 
approach to sampling would have been required (Creswell, 2007). As will be discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six, this small sample, and the format of some of the questions, limited 
my ability to produce a multi-layered or generalizable result. However, the conversations 
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and anecdotes shared did allow for some preliminary results about the role of the counsel 
based on the opinions of the interviewees. Those opinions also allowed for the 
comparison of the general counsel’s role to that of an academic dean in order to place the 
counsel position in the context of institutional leadership.  
After I confirmed the individual’s willingness to participate, I obtained informed 
consent. The interviews were recorded so that they could be transcribed and/or re-heard 
for analysis as suggested by Ritchie (2003) and Kyvig & Marty (2010). Because I was 
dealing with one aspect of an individual’s career, the interviews were no longer than an 
hour. While I was interested in the background of my interviewees, my subject matter 
was limited in scope. That being said, I did not artificially end interviews. If the subject 
of the interview provided important and valuable information relevant to the topic, Oral 
History protocol required that I allow the interviewee to continue (Ritchie, 2003). I also 
kept the identities of my interviewees confidential so as to foster the dissemination of 
more detailed accounts (Kyvig & Marty, 2010). In addition, following the transcription of 
the interviews, I sent the transcript to my interviewees so that they could validate their 
statements to ensure that the transcription was accurate (Ritchie, 2003). 
My method of analysis was similar to that used for the documentary material. 
Interviews were coded thematically (Weber, 1990), looking for data that conveyed the 
interviewee’s view of the role of the general counsel. Rather than code based on 
paragraph, data was coded by question asked. This was due to the conversational nature 
of the interviews. In addition to the interviewee’s articulation of his or her view of the 
role, I was most concerned with the reason(s) behind that view and any examples of that 
view being implemented during their careers. It is within these two broad topics that 
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themes were developed to explain the issues. The ultimate goal of the interviews was to 
find data that either complemented or contradicted the views of the practitioner/authors of 
the literature on the topic of the general counsel’s office and to present that data in an 
unbiased way.   
Conclusion 
Through a historical lens, this research sought to better understand the 
relationship between regulation, litigation, and the establishment of general counsel’s 
offices on college and university campuses. Using a combination of documentary 
analysis of regulatory trends and case law, along with the use of Oral History methods, 
this project provided a multi-dimensional look using both documents and personal 
recollections. As a historical, qualitative study, the goal was not to answer all of the 
questions surrounding the intersection of the law and higher education institutions. The 
goal of this exploratory study, rather, was to provide a starting point for further 
exploration of the topic.  
The next chapter discusses the results of the document-based research scheme 
explained in this chapter by exploring the historical impetus for the establishment of in-
house counsel offices on college and university campuses. Chapter Five applies the 
methods discussed in this chapter to interviews with current and former counsels 
regarding their roles, and places the role of the institutional counsel within the context of 
higher education leadership. Chapter Six concludes this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Regulation and Case Law as Impetuses for 
On Campus General Counsel Offices 
Introduction 
On modern day college or university campuses, from a large Research One 
institution to a small liberal arts college, the institutional counsel or institutional 
counsel’s office plays a significant role in the administration of the college or university. 
While these offices vary in size and scope of responsibility, they all deal with complex 
issues centering on litigation, regulation, and compliance. Laws like FERPA, HIPAA, 
The Clery Act, Title IX, Title VI, Title IV, and other federal and state laws require 
experts who can help institutions navigate the legal realm. For example, the Vice 
Chancellor and General Counsel’s office at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill employs ten attorneys who cover fifty-one enumerated legal areas of interest or 
expertise ranging from athletics to environmental law to insurance to tax (UNC, 2013a). 
Contained within these fifty-one topics are issues involving both regulation and litigation.  
As noted earlier in this dissertation, Peter Ruger, in a 1997 article in the Stetson 
Law Review, briefly mentioned case law and regulation as impetuses for the need for 
general counsel offices. In addition to mentioning case law, Ruger (1997) wrote “the 
1970s witnessed a significant growth in the federal regulation of higher education” (pp. 
178-9). The number of cases involving higher education also increased. Ruger (1997) 
noted that in West’s case digests, a publication that catalogs recent cases, the number of 
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cases focusing on higher education grew by 53% from 1936-1986. In addition, 
Ruger(1997) wrote “the 1970s witnessed a significant growth in the federal regulation of 
higher education” (pp. 178-9). Numerically speaking, during this time period the number 
of counsel offices increased. According to Ruger (1997), prior to the 1960s about twelve 
general counsel offices existed on college campuses. During the 1960s, twenty more were 
created, and by 1970 sixty more were added (Ruger, 1997). Ruger’s figures were based 
on a study by the National Association of College and University Attorneys. 
This chapter elaborates on the issues touched on by Ruger (1997) and others 
including Bickel (1974) and Sensenbrenner (1974). The aim of this section of the 
dissertation is to add some substance to the assertion that case law and increased 
regulation necessitated the creation of in-house general counsel offices on campus. The 
first part of this chapter will focus on developments in the area of governmental 
regulation as a means to explain the proliferation of general counsel offices. The second 
part of this chapter will look at case law and the evolution of case analysis from a basis in 
contract law, to deference to institutions, to a more complex approach involving the use 
of Constitutional law principles.  
Organization of the Chapter 
As noted in the previous chapter, the purpose of the following discussion is to, for 
the first time, elaborate on assertions made in the literature that the impetus for the 
proliferation of in-house institutional counsel offices was rooted in the expanded 
regulation of higher education, and the student and faculty rights movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s (Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 1997; Sensenbrenner, 1974). To accomplish this goal, 
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two different organizational forms are used in this chapter to present the information. The 
regulation section is organized as it was coded--by the sources of the regulation. This 
organizational scheme allows the reader to see the multiple levels of accountability 
institutions faced. 
The case law discussion is not designed to be all encompassing nor to cover 
certain laws. It is designed to be a narrative of how courts applied the law to cases 
involving higher education from the beginning of the 20th century to the individual rights 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s. It is intended to show that an increase in the volume 
of cases and, more importantly, in the nature and complexity of the law used to analyze 
cases, illustrating the points made in the literature (Bickel, 1974; Ruger 1997, 
Sensenbrenner, 1974). The latter part of the case law discussion is split into issues 
involving faculty and issues involving students, allowing the reader to understand the 
progression in the legal relationship between both constituencies and the institutions. This 
approach is in-line with the coding scheme outline in Chapter Three. 
Regulation 
Federally initiated regulation. The 1960s and 1970s marked the beginning of a 
major shift toward access to higher education for all eligible students in American 
society. The Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954 and the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 opened the door for African-Americans to gain access to higher education (Thelin, 
2011). However, other groups, like women and the economically disadvantaged were still 
somewhat precluded from attending or working at colleges or universities (Wolanin & 
Gladieux, 1975). According to a 1975 article from the Journal of Law and Education 
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written by Thomas Wolanin and Lawrence Gladieux, the Educational Amendments of 
1972 created new mechanisms to ensure that colleges and universities were accessible to 
any eligible student. More germane to this study, the Educational Amendments of 1972 
created new programs, rules, and reporting requirements which put additional pressure on 
the relationship between higher education institutions and the federal government, 
necessitating someone, or several people, who could interface with the government 
regularly and appropriately. 
Access to higher education was a federal priority as far back as the Higher 
Education Act of 1965, in which the federal government expressed an explicit 
commitment to equalizing opportunity to access higher education in the United States 
(Gladieux, 1986). In the beginning of their 1975 article, Wolanin and Gladieux noted that 
to them, laws expressed both the policy judgments and aspirations of the government (p. 
302). This point is most adept when one looks at the financial aid programs initiated by 
the Educational Amendments of 1972. As President Nixon noted at the time, “no 
qualified student who wants to go to college should be barred by lack of money” 
(Wolanin & Gladieux, 1975, p. 303). To support this articulated aspiration, the law 
included the creation of Basic Educational Opportunity Grants or BEOGs. These grants, 
which were the precursors to the modern day Pell Grants and Stafford Loans, provided 
students with four-year grants up to $1400 per year. Grant amounts were adjusted based 
on an individual family’s income (Wolanin & Gladieux, 1975). In addition to the 
BEOGs, the federal government introduced an expanded version of the TRIO Program 
designed to prepare more economically disadvantaged yet academically talented students 
for higher education. Another important aspect of the 1972 law was that the act extended 
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eligibility for BEOGs to private institutions. This expansion of the eligibility of financial 
aid effected a dramatic growth in student aid programs (Gladieux, 1986). This expansion 
also extended the reach of federal reporting requirements to non-public institutions. 
Therefore, as a result of accepting financial aid from the federal government virtually all 
institutions of higher education became subject became accountable to the federal 
government. The federal government wanted data on how the money was being spent, 
who was receiving the aid, and later, an aggregate assessment of how successful those 
students were. 
In addition to creating economic mechanisms to facilitate access to higher 
education, the federal government included a section of the 1972 Act that broadly 
protected women from discrimination based on gender in the educational setting. The law 
stated “no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subject to discrimination under any 
educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance” (Wolanin & 
Gladieux, 1975). This broad prohibition was modeled off Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 that prohibited discrimination in education based on race. Prior to the passing of 
Title IX, women had been broadly discriminated against both in undergraduate and 
graduate admissions in the higher education context (Wolanin & Gladieux, 1975).    
While the Educational Amendments of 1972 provided additional financial 
opportunities for individuals and precluded discrimination based on gender, the law 
represented a significant shift in the federal approach to higher education institutions. As 
Wolanin and Gladieux noted:  
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[t]here was a forceful rejection of the philosophy that the continued existence of 
institutions of higher education qua institutions was a federal purpose justifying 
institutional aid. Instead the federal purpose that was deemed to justify institutional aid 
was the purpose identified above…equalization of opportunities for higher education (p. 
309). 
The above quotation represented an extremely important point about the nature of the 
relationship between higher education institutions and the federal government. Prior to 
1972, the federal government had been concerned with bolstering institutional 
enrollments in order to keep the higher education system in the United States strong 
(Gladieux, 1986).  No longer was the government concerned about the wellbeing of 
individual institutions. Instead, the government was concerned with those institutions 
being accessible to all people. With that change came a shift from a more lax approach to 
regulation to a more demanding approach to ensure that the government’s priorities were 
accomplished.    
The change in the nature of the relationship between the government and the post-
secondary education world resulted in increased accountability on the part of the 
institutions to the federal government (Gladieux, 1986; Wolanin & Gladieux, 1975). The 
government was interested in whether the money it was spending on higher education 
met several requirements: Were expenditures within the manner and purpose of the law? 
Was the spending faithful to legislative intent? Was the program receiving the funds 
achieving its intended goal? What were the costs versus the benefits? Finally, was budget 
money being used in the most efficient way possible? (Wolanin & Gladieux, 1975). All 
of these questions relied on data from institutions to answer. In addition, accountability 
trickled down to institutions, and those institutions had to present viable arguments as to 
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how they were in compliance with federal goals and guidelines (Wolanin & Gladieux, 
1975). 
By the late 1980s, the government’s emphasis on access began to backfire as the 
demand for federal dollars in the form of guaranteed loans began to grow while the 
overall economy slowed down. In a 1989 article in Change, Gladieux, who had in articles 
in the 1970s and early 1980s heralded the involvement of the federal government in 
higher education, began to note significant changes in the government’s approach to 
assisting with access. In particular, the debate over the government’s involvement in 
access to higher education rose to the forefront of public debate during the 1988 
presidential race between George H.W. Bush and Michael Dukakis (Gladieux, 1989).  
Gladieux noted that in the 1970s family income levels had risen, available aid was 
growing at a faster pace than tuition, grant aid was more common than borrowing, and 
the cost of tuition was rising more slowly than the Consumer Price Index (Gladieux, 
1989). By the late 1980s, all of those positive indicators had shifted. Loans became more 
popular, with Stafford loans “provid[ing] over $9 billion in aid annually” (Gladieux, 
1989, p. 36). Similarly the “buying power” of a Pell Grant fell by 25% (Gladieux, 1989). 
College costs were also rising (Gladieux, 1989).  This set the stage for an imminent 
conflict between the federal government, which, by the 1988 presidential election, was 
running significant deficits, and institutions that needed federal money in the form of aid 
to survive (Gladieux, 1989). It also set the stage for an era of even more demands for 
accountability on the part of colleges and universities to the federal government. If the 
government was providing through students (in the form of loans) more money, then it 
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expected significantly more information on how that money was being used (Gladieux, 
1989). 
As discussed earlier, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 was a 
landmark law in terms of creating access to higher education for women both in roles as 
students and employees (Olivas, 1984). During the 1984 Supreme Court term, the Court 
decided an important case that greatly expanded the role of the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Education) to regulate and penalize 
institutions that did not comply with Title IX (Olivas, 1984). While this expanded role for 
the Department was enumerated in case law, it represented the delegation of enormous 
regulatory and enforcement power to the federal government and, therefore, is germane 
to a discussion of regulation as an impetus to an on campus general counsel’s office. 
The case cited by Olivas (1984), North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 
involved a school district that refused to rehire a tenured female after she took maternity 
leave. The teacher filed a complaint with the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW). HEW, as part of its investigative process, requested information from 
the district. The district refused to comply with HEW’s request and sued claiming HEW 
did not have the authority to enforce Title IX in the employment context (Olivas, 1984). 
The Supreme Court, with Justice Blackmun writing for the majority, noted that the “no 
person” clause in Title IX was meant to include employees as well as students. In 
addition, Blackmun relied on excerpts from the pre-enactment debate, specifically 
statements by Senator Bayh, the bill’s main sponsor, which indicated that the law was 
meant to ban sex discrimination in all aspects of the educational environment (Olivas, 
1984). 
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What the Bell decision did was further expand the ability of the federal 
government to regulate gender access to higher education. Previous interpretations, 
including the one promulgated by the school system in the case, had already 
acknowledged the ability of the federal government, to regulate female student access to 
higher education. This case took that determination one step further and expanded the 
role of the federal government creating even more opportunities for activities of colleges 
and universities to be scrutinized. 
The examples of the financing of higher education and, gender equity in higher 
education discussed above are just two instances of the government’s emphasis on access 
in the 1970s and 1980s intensifying regulatory pressure on colleges and universities. This 
trend toward increased reporting and a greater focus on access continues to this day as 
noted in President Obama’s priority of lowering college costs, and contributes to the need 
for attorneys on campus. Campus attorneys are educated in the terminology used in 
regulations, laws, and demands from the government. Therefore, they are in a position to 
help others respond to government data inquiries and standards. In addition, attorneys, 
practicing proactive law, can help ensure that requirements are followed and respond to 
problems if they are not. In the next section of this paper, I will explore another aspect of 
the federal government’s involvement in higher education: research and development 
(R&D) funding. 
While ensuring access and safety are large parts of the federal government’s role 
in higher education, in a publication produced by The College Board in 1987, Gladieux 
and Gwendolyn Lewis noted that the federal government “provid[es] about a quarter of 
all college and university revenues” (p. 1). In addition, the authors wrote, “Washington 
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supports higher education through direct student aid [access] and funds for university-
based research and development” (p. 1). With funding for research and development 
came regulations about how money could be spent, and how results should be reported. 
These rules, along with funding levels were constantly changing. Colleges and 
universities needed individuals, like attorneys,  focused on the changing federal 
landscape to help the institution, and its constituents, maneuver and adapt to changing 
funding levels, reporting requirements, and regulatory language.  
The impetus for government funding of research grew out of the Tenth 
Amendment to the Constitution (Gladieux & King, 1987). The Tenth Amendment 
reserved all powers for the states not specifically delegated to the national government 
(U.S. Const. amed. X.). This included the responsibility for developing higher education. 
As a result, no national university was created. To forward the priorities of the national 
government, the federal government provided money to colleges and universities to 
forward its goals (Gladieux & King, 1987). During the nineteenth century, the federal 
government provided money to the states, which then distributed funds to institutions 
(Gladieux & King, 1987). While effective and fully respecting the Tenth Amendment, 
this scheme did not create a level of accountability to the federal government. By the 
twentieth century, the disbursement model had shifted to the federal government directly 
funding colleges and universities at significant levels. In fiscal year 1985, the federal 
government provided approximately 23.7% of funding for higher education (Gladieux & 
King, 1987). In addition, prior to 1985, 400 programs based in over 25 federal agencies 
provided some support to higher education (Gladieux & King, 1987).  
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While the numbers noted above seem high, the late 1980s represented an increase 
in research and development funds given to higher education institutions (Gladieux & 
King, 1987). Historically, those numbers have fluctuated, creating an environment in 
which institutions needed to adapt. From World War II until the mid-1960s, research and 
development (R&D) funds were significant. This was in part due to the defense industry 
needing institutional partners and the federal government encouraging those 
collaborations. By the late 1960s and 1970s, with the country and its resources focused 
on the Vietnam War, resources for R&D became less available. This trend continued 
until the early 1980s when funding again grew. Between 1980 and 1985 federal funding 
for R&D grew by almost two-billion dollars (Gladieux & King, 1987).  
By 1993, what had been nearly a quarter of revenue for higher education in 1985 
fell to about 10% (Gladieux & Lewis, 1995). This shift was due primarily to the federal 
government’s focus in the early 1990s on deficit reduction (Gladieux & Lewis, 1995). In 
addition, the allocation of federal resources to R&D, which had been a systematic process 
prior to the 1990s, took a piecemeal approach in which R&D projects were added to bills 
as “pork barrel” projects. This was in part due to the fact that legislators did not want to 
be seen passing large R&D spending bills. Congressmen were content to hide 
appropriations in other spending and non-spending legislation (Gladieux & Lewis, 1995).  
Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, R&D funding for colleges and universities 
recovered, peaking in 2003 at $22.5 billion (NSF, 2010). However, with the election of 
George W. Bush, funding levels dropped back to about $20 billion (NSF, 2010).  
The information presented above leads to the question: How does R&D funding 
and the changing federal approach to funding levels and purpose link back to the need for 
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a general counsel? The answer is two-fold and is rooted in both accountability and 
flexibility. As John Thelin noted in a 2000 article from The Case International Journal of 
Educational Advancement, when initial charters were granted to institutions in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was no expectation of state or federal funding. 
Government funding of higher education is a modern construct and with the funding 
came the need for accountability. As Thelin wrote, the 1980s brought about a “reliance 
on timely information and careful data analyses” (Thelin, 2000, p. 15). Thelin aptly noted 
that this need for accountability brought about the need for an office of government 
relations. At the same time, the need for clear communication and adherence to laws and 
contracts with the government, coupled with the ever changing priorities of the 
government, created legal issues which required the services of legal counsel.   
While the current section of this chapter has focused on federal government 
initiated regulations and their impact on colleges and universities as impetuses for general 
counsel’s offices, institutions themselves lobbied for increased regulation when the 
regulation benefitted the institutions. The next section will explore one such regulation 
and why that law could have spurred the need for in-house university legal counsel.   
Institution-supported regulation. One byproduct of increased governmental 
funding of research was the need to decide who owned the discovery, product, or 
invention that resulted from the research funded by a governmental agency. The right of 
ownership was created when an entity filed a patent application with the U.S. 
Government’s Patent and Trademark Office (Mowery, 2000). Patenting was not a new 
concept to colleges and universities. Institutions of higher education had been patenting 
inventions since the 1920s (Mowery, 2000). What did emerge in the 1960s, ‘70s and 
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significantly contributed to the need for in-house counsel, was the desire of research 
universities in particular to be able to patent discoveries reached using federal funding. 
The difficulty was convincing the federal government to create a comprehensive 
mechanism to allow institutions to do just that. Once the federal government capitulated 
in 1980 with the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, attorneys were needed more than ever to 
both patent products and ensure compliance with federal regulations (Berman, 2008).  
In an article in Social Studies of Science from 2008, Elizabeth Popp Berman, a 
sociologist at the University at Albany, provided a comprehensive chronicle of how the 
Bayh-Dole Act came to fruition. Berman’s fundamental argument was that the 
institutionalization of patent officers at colleges and universities unified institutions 
behind the idea of a comprehensive and uniform method of ensuring patent rights for the 
institutions. 
During the 1950s, only a few institutions employed patent counsel (Berman, 
2008). This was primarily a result of few, if any, agencies offering patent rights to 
institutions for federally funded projects. The Department of Defense permitted 
contractors to retain patents. The Atomic Energy Commission, on the other hand, refused 
to relinquish rights to patents funded by agency funds (Berman, 2008). During the 1950 
to 1970 time period one major agency, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) and its subordinate agency, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), had a policy 
of granting patent rights to colleges and universities (Berman, 2008). At the time, HEW 
and NIH combined granted about 55% of all federal research funding for colleges and 
universities (Berman, 2008).  
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Prior to 1963, the HEW ran a two track patent process. Institutions could ask the 
Department to waive title to any invention (Berman, 2008). The institution had to show 
that it had the administrative capacity to advance the project—meaning it had both the 
financial and human resources to complete and ultimately use and/or market the 
invention (Berman, 2008). To establish this showing an institution had to provide a 
significant amount of paperwork to the Department. In addition, the office reviewing the 
documentation was short staffed (Berman, 2008). Institutions could also only apply for 
one title waiver at a time (Berman, 2008).  The other option institutions could avail 
themselves of was an Individual Patent Agreements or IPA (Berman, 2008). IPAs granted 
universities patent rights to all inventions produced with HEW funds provided the 
institutions met certain criteria. The difficulty with these initial IPAs was that the 
aforementioned criteria varied by institution-- there was no uniformity across institutions 
(Berman, 2008). 
While the IPAs themselves were not uniform, a somewhat uniform response 
across institutions with IPAs was to hire individuals to administer patents (Berman, 
2008). These individuals could be both attorneys and non-attorneys. IPAs themselves 
required a person be identified to be the liaison with HEW (Berman, 2008). By 1974, the 
Society of University Patent Administrators (SUPA) was established to represent the 
interests of patent officers and university based inventors (Berman, 2008). By 1977, two 
major and conflicting events had happened. First, the SUPA had grown in its ability to 
lobby Congress and, second, a new Secretary had been appointed to oversee the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Berman, 2008). The new Secretary 
ordered that all IPAs and patent release application be placed under the review of the 
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Department’s general counsel’s office, effectively stopping the ability of universities to 
patent inventions. The new Secretary felt that the government should have benefitted 
financially from inventions created with its money. He did not agree with the process of 
allowing institutions to patent and potentially profit off federally funded research 
(Berman, 2008).    
The Department’s actions galvanized both universities and the SUPA. Both began 
to lobby key senators including Birch Bayh, Ted Kennedy, and Bob Dole. Previous 
attempts to gain blanket legislation allowing for universities to patent federally funded 
inventions had failed (Berman, 2008).  During the debate in late 1970s, proponents of a 
law were far more skilled in their lobbying tactics. Proponents of legislation placed the 
argument for a blanket law in the context of the innovation gap with Japan. They argued 
that because US laws were so unequal and cumbersome, scientific and engineering 
developments were behind Japan (Berman, 2008). In addition, SUPA argued that since 
the virtual hold at HEW, thirty innovations that could have helped to save lives had been 
held up (Berman, 2008). As a result of actions by universities and the SUPA, the Bayh-
Dole Act passed Congress and was signed into law in 1980. The law created a system 
where the default was that colleges and universities retained title to any inventions 
developed with federal funds (Berman, 2008).   
While Bayh-Dole did create a universal mechanism for institutions to retain the 
patent rights to inventions discovered with federal funds, it also created a complex legal 
process that necessitated the hiring of experts both in patent law and administrative 
regulations. Under the Act, institutions retaining rights to patent inventions was the 
standard. However, there were certain exceptions to the rule. Institutions had to allow the 
55 
government to use the invention free of charge. In addition, the government could 
“march-in” and require that institutions license the invention to a third party, provided 
that the third party did not commercialize the invention (Raubitschek, 2005). This process 
required that the department in question to conduct a 30-day fact-finding proceeding with 
the contractor being given the opportunity to present an argument against the 
department’s request. Any decision then made by the department could be appealed to the 
Court of Federal Claims. To ensure that the institution’s rights were respected and to 
participate in, or contest, the government using this process, institutions needed attorneys 
familiar with the intricacies of both patent and administrative law (Raubitschek, 2005). 
A 1984 amendment to the original Bayh-Dole Act set a timeline for institutions to 
exercise their patent rights (Raubitschek, 2005). Prior to Bayh-Dole, under the IPA 
scheme, an institution had to notify an agency of its intent to patent an invention within 
six months of fabricating the invention. This, in the opinion of institutions, made the 
process longer and less certain (Raubitschek, 2005). Institutions lobbied for, and received 
a change in the law. The language changed from notification within six months to 
notification within a “reasonable time” which was defined by the law as two months 
(Raubitschek, 2005). This allowed institutions to have a more expedited process. 
Following notification of the discovery, an institution or inventor had two years to elect 
whether to retain title. Following the election of title an institution had one year to file the 
patent. Only if the inventor failed to meet the deadlines in the law or if the inventor 
declined to patent an invention could the government patent an invention (Raubitschek, 
2005). 
56 
The Bayh-Dole Act represented an institution driven shift toward a regulated and 
uniform approach to the patenting of the results of federally funded research. It allowed 
institutions to profit from their work and offered incentives for higher education to 
produce innovative products and ideas that could ultimately help the country and its 
people. The Act also created the need for increased bureaucracy and expertise within the 
university setting. This set the stage for both institutional patent offices and in-house 
attorneys able to deal with intellectual property laws and regulations. Not only did 
institutions need lawyers capable of navigating the patent process under Bayh-Dole, they 
also needed attorneys able to defend their property interests if a patent was violated.  
Federal regulation of higher education takes many forms. Most of the regulations 
were initiated by the government itself. Other federal level regulation came with the 
support of institutions. Regardless of the impetus for the regulation, experts were required 
to help institutions work within and ultimately benefit (if possible) from the regulations. 
In many instances, these experts were institutional counsel trained in either topical law 
i.e. patents, or basic regulatory law. This training helped institutions navigate the 
constantly shifting terrain of regulatory law during a period of time where the amount and 
impact of regulations increased dramatically. 
 The previous sections have discussed aspects of federal regulation of higher 
education institutions both initiated by the federal government on its own volition and 
regulation supported by institutions. Along with the federal government, state 
governments were and are additional important factors in the regulation of institutions. 
State governments, both through law making and administrative processes, have 
enormous regulatory authority over colleges and universities due to the direct funding of 
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institutions by states. The next section of this chapter explores state related regulatory 
issues and their potential impact on the establishment of general counsel offices on 
college and university campuses. 
State regulation. It is important to note from the outset that when talking about a 
state’s impact on higher education, most scholars refer to a state’s relationship with 
public institutions within its borders. For the most part, private schools are insulated from 
state government machinations and changes. The same holds true for this section.  In this 
section the terms colleges and universities are used to refer to public schools which 
receive a significant portion of their funding from state governments.  
The relationship between an individual college or university campus and the state 
administrative body that either regulates or coordinates the activities of the institution is 
complex and varies by state. As early as 1982, only thirty percent of “senior” public 
institutions were governed by individual governing boards. The rest were under multi-
campus systems (Berdahl & Peterson, 1982). As Aims McGuinness (2003) noted, there 
were nineteen different structures of public higher education across the country. These 
models ranged from a strong governing board for all higher education in the state, to a 
strong governing board for four-year institutions and another for two-year schools, to a 
weak coordinating board with little direct authority (McGuinness, 2003). Regardless of 
the nature of the relationship between institutions and governing/coordinating agencies, 
colleges and universities had to have staff who could help institutions adapt to changing 
demands or requirements of state boards. Like the federal regulations discussed above, 
those staff members were, according to Ruger (1997), attorneys. Another potential  
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complication was that board priorities and policies were and still are often dictated by 
legislators and governors who are subject to political pressures and can often be 
inconsistent due to those pressures (Berdahl & Gove, 1982). With changing priorities and 
outside governance came rules and regulations that needed to be analyzed and made 
understandable to the various campus constituencies. This is the role of a general counsel. 
In-house counsels become familiar with the people involved with decision making at the 
system level. In addition, due to their knowledge of both their institutions and how to 
understand and interpret regulatory language, they can advocate on behalf of their 
institution in an effective way. 
While a discussion of state governing boards is important, talking about 
organizational charts and changing requirements is a bit theoretical in nature. In a 1988 
article in The Journal of Higher Education, Michael Olivas presented a tangible example 
of state laws and priorities impacting higher education. His commentary also presented a 
compelling reason for the need for a general counsel to manage state regulations.  
Olivas’ (1988) piece is focused on residency requirements. Most states charge 
differential tuition based on whether a student is a resident of the state or not. The 
responsibility for setting residency rules is vested in different bodies on a state by state 
basis. In addition, the residency requirements vary state by state. Whether a student is a 
resident or not has a significant impact on institutions. Institutions bring in significantly 
more tuition revenue from out-of-state students than from in-state students (Olivas, 
1988). 
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In 1988, the main test of residency was whether a student intended to make a state 
his or her permanent domicile (Olivas, 1998). However, before a student could stand for 
review on that question, he or she had to, depending on the state, wait up to twelve 
months. That is essentially one full school year of out-of-state tuition. Different states 
also used different methods when reviewing the two fundamental questions of domicile: 
whether the student resided in the state and whether the student had “an intention to make 
that residence the home and abode” (Olivas, 1988, p. 266). The rationale Olivas and 
states gave for this rather subjective test is that states want to ensure that “students 
establish and maintain genuine ties to the state; to ensure that students do not ‘forum 
shop’ and pick from several states where they can manufacture or allege contacts; to 
make the declaration of residence more meaningful and seriously considered than mere 
presence requires.” (Olivas, 1988, pp. 266-67).  
While the questions asked by states are similar, who sets the specific requirements 
and makes the residency decision varies by state. It is this variance that is an example of a 
legal issue that warrants the assistance of counsel. Olivas (1988) divided states into five 
types based on requirements for residency. Type I states, of which there were twenty in 
1988, reserved the power to the legislature to decide residency policy. Seven Type II 
states delegated residency determination policy to state agencies or coordinating boards. 
Two Type III states gave power to the institutions to make the decision. In twenty-two 
Type IV and V states, there were no specific laws on who makes the determination of 
residency. In the seven Type IV states, a state agency or board had assumed the 
responsibility for the determination. In the remaining Type V states, institutions had 
assumed the authority to make residency decisions (Olivas, 1988). Complicating the 
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decision-making process further, numerous states had exceptions or offered waivers 
allowing some classes of people immediate residency. These classes include: minors, 
military personnel, or other miscellaneous categories (Olivas, 1988). 
This lack of uniformity and, in some cases, direct accountability to state agencies 
or legislatures could have served as an additional impetus for a general counsel’s office. 
Attorneys are capable of developing comprehensive policies and procedures that ensure 
uniformity in decision making and process (in as much as the individual state laws allow 
for uniformity) and can interface with state agencies or legislatures, if need be. In 
addition, in-house counsel can deal with student challenges to residency determinations 
in an effective way. 
While regulation of higher education could have played a significant role in the 
need to establish in-house law offices on college campuses, so did the reemergence of 
litigation.  The next section of this chapter will discuss the history of campus-based 
litigation and explain a historical and societal shift in the 1960s and 1970s that could be 
used to illustrate an assertion in the literature that the student and faculty rights 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s led to the proliferation of institutional counsel 
(Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 1997; Sensenbrenner, 1974). 
Case Law 
Earlier in this dissertation, it was noted by Bickel (1974), Sensenbrenner (1974), 
and Ruger (1997) that the student and faculty rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
led to increased litigation and the need for campus counsel. However, their articles made 
it seem like institutions had not previously dealt with a significant number of court cases. 
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That is not a true assertion. College and university campuses faced a substantial amount 
of litigation at the beginning of the 20th century without needing in-house counsel. In 
addition to an increase in the volume of cases, as evidenced by fact that the number of 
cases involving higher education reported by West went up by 53% between 1936 and 
1986 (Ruger, 1997), the individual rights movements also brought about a shift in the law 
courts used to resolve cases. This new reliance on Constitutional principles created a far 
more complex and nuanced legal environment for institutions to work within—providing 
a possible explanation for the need for in-house attorneys. This section tracks that 
progression. 
Courts and campuses up to the era of in loco parentis. Historically speaking, 
in the early part of the 20th century, the basis for courts interfering with the student/
faculty/institution relationship was primarily based on statutory and contract law, both of 
which were fairly straightforward and lacked nuance (Gelber, 2014a). Following this 
period of decisions based on statutory and contract law and the period of significant 
deference to institutions (also known as in loco parentis), shifts in society during the 
1960s caused courts to apply Constitutional and civil rights to cases which may have 
been treated differently during the first part of the century. This application of 
Constitutional and civil rights principles to colleges and universities created extremely 
nuanced law that required strong analytical skills, and both a proactive and reactive 
response on the part of institutions. This section is designed to illustrate the relationship 
between courts, campuses, and attorneys during the early to mid-20th century in order to 
show the stark shift that came about in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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In a forthcoming article in the Teachers College Record, historian Scott Gelber 
discusses in great length the primary nature of court cases against colleges and 
universities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. At the time, courts were either 
unable or unwilling to put a significant amount of time into complex analysis and often 
relied on the plain language of the controlling law or document. For example, in 1910, 
Purdue University banned fraternities on campus (Gelber, 2014b). A student challenged 
the University’s policy. The University responded that enrolling at the institution was not 
a legal right and therefore the University could do as it pleased. The Indiana Supreme 
Court disagreed. Citing the plain language of the law establishing the University, the 
Court wrote that Purdue had an obligation to educate anyone living in the state who was 
not ill nor incapacitated (Gelber, 2014a). While this outcome was ultimately against the 
institution, the analysis was straightforward and not nuanced. Similar language was 
written in a 1908 case from Minnesota in which the University of Minnesota expelled a 
student purportedly for academic and character reasons. In fact, the real reason was that 
the student was involved in trying to usurp control of athletic teams away from the school 
(Gelber, 2014a). The Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the student based on the same 
rationale used in the Purdue case—statutory language. (Gelber 2014a). 
The same basic language-based approach to the student/institution relationship 
was also present during the late 1800s and early 1900s in cases involving private schools. 
As Gelber (2014b) noted “contracts emerged as the dominant legal structure for 
regulating financial affairs in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries…Over 
time, contractual logic also emerged as a common framework for defining a wide range 
of other relationships” (p. 15). Courts viewed a student or faculty member’s relationship 
63 
with a college or university in the same light. As an example of this approach, Gelber 
(2014b) talks about an 1887 case from Dickinson College. At the time, Dickinson 
students were divided into two major camps: students who respected the authority of the 
faculty and students who sought to test the authority of the faculty. As a prank, students 
would disable the College’s bell in order to delay classes from starting (the bell signaled 
when it was time for classes to change). Following such a prank, the College’s President 
convened a meeting of the faculty in his office. In order to disrupt the meeting, students 
threw rocks at the President’s window, and the window was shattered. One student, John 
Martz Hill, was interviewed and expelled because “he seemed uncomfortable during his 
interrogation” (Gelber, 2014b, p. 14). Hill sued and the Court found that the case was not 
unlike a contract violation case in that the accused student deserved a hearing and the 
ability to defend himself versus a summary dismissal (Gelber, 2014b).  
In addition to working against the interests of colleges and universities, 
sometimes the contractual, non-nuanced approach worked for institutions. Another case 
Gelber (2014a) cited was a 1901 case against Case Western Reserve University. Case 
expelled a student after completing a disciplinary hearing. The Ohio court found that the 
University had acted with “prudence and discretion” as required by the contract with the 
student (Gelber, 2014a). A similar decision was reached by a New York court in a 1902 
case against New York University (Gelber, 2014a).  
Under the scheme of the early 20th century, institutions could rely on either 
external counsel or on staff law professors to represent their interests. Unlike 
Constitutional law, plain language law was not overly complex. In addition, institutions 
were not dealing with the frequency of litigation or legal challenges like they do in  
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the modern day (Ruger, 1997). Therefore, due to both the nature of the cases and their 
lack of frequency it would not have been prohibitively expensive to hire outside counsel 
when necessary.  
By 1910, the vast majority of courts had moved away from the analysis of 
contracts and statutes and toward offering significant deference to colleges and 
universities. Gelber, (2014a) credits two factors with this shift. First, higher education 
boomed during the early 1900s. Campus populations grew, as did faculty and 
administrative staffs. To courts, this growth warranted a higher level of deference since 
courts did not feel they had the expertise to address issues involving colleges and 
universities. Second, the 1910s brought with them the emergence of a progressive 
philosophy which rejected older methods of operation like reliance on common law and 
contracts and embraced the expertise of administrators and faculty members (Gelber, 
2014a). This rejection of contract rights and adoption of progressive philosophies led to 
the emergence of the in loco parentis approach of colleges and universities and the 
acceptance of this approach by courts. One court case, Gott v. Berea College (1913), 
which is cited by (Gelber, 2014b), shows the authority institutions possessed toward 
students in the early part of the twentieth century.  
In 1913, Berea College, a private institution in Kentucky, established a rule 
stating that students could not eat in establishments not owned by the College. The 
penalty for breaking the rule was expulsion. Gott, a restaurant owner in Berea, sued 
Berea College for interfering in his business and for slander (Gott, 1913). The College 
defended itself, noting that it was a private institution and that the policy was designed to 
ensure that its students did not waste money and stayed engrossed in their studies. The 
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Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed with Berea’s argument. Berea owed no duty to Gott. 
In addition, the Court stated that the College stood in loco parentis of its students and 
therefore, could make rules a parent could. The Court affirmed Berea’s ability to draft 
and enact broad by-laws for governance and operations except when public monies were 
involved. Since Berea was private, no public monies were in play. Therefore, the College 
could create any rule it wanted (Gott, 1913). 
In loco parentis remained the standard approach of colleges toward students well 
into the mid-twentieth century. As mentioned above, the acceptance of the progressive 
philosophy idea of higher education institution as benevolent parent became the norm. As 
a result, colleges and universities were rarely challenged by students. The acceptance of 
this philosophy negated the need for the use of attorneys whether in-house or external. As 
the next section will show, a more activist and involved society led to more activist courts 
during the 1960s and 1970s. These courts, in keeping with shifts in the priorities of the 
overall American society, began to attribute Constitutional and civil rights to students and 
faculty alike. Courts were no longer willing to accept in loco parentis or the granting of 
significant deference to colleges and universities in employment matters. Courts, in 
keeping with social trends, were also not willing to revert back to the use of contract law 
as the primary means of regulating relationships between higher education institutions 
and their constituencies. Instead, courts relied on highly nuanced Constitutional law that 
could have significantly contributed to the establishment of in-house counsel’s office to 
deal with the ramifications of new student and faculty rights. 
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The great societal shift: Constitutional rights come to campus. The 1960s 
were a decade of significant disruption and change on college and university campuses. 
Students were less apt to accept and follow the orders or requirements of campus 
administrators and were more likely to make their discontent known. One example of 
student discontent occurred at the University of California, Berkeley in 1964. The 
administration decided that a sidewalk in front of campus could no longer be used for 
political meetings or other expression purposes. Students disobeyed and were disciplined 
by the institution. Following the disciplining of these students, other students staged sit-
ins and strikes (Geiger, 2004). Similar events took place at the University of Chicago, the 
University of Wisconsin, CUNY, and Columbia University (Thelin, 2011). While these 
events occurred on university campuses, according to Geiger (2004), the students’ 
response to the administrations of these campuses was rooted in far broader societal 
issues. To Geiger, the student rebellion on campus drew its strength from “opposition to 
the war in Vietnam…the civil rights movement…and the universities themselves” 
(Geiger, 2004, p. 231; Ruger, 1997).   
The push for more individual rights was not just limited to college and university 
campuses. The 1960s brought with them significant activism across the country and a 
shift away from a paternalistic sense of government and society. As Geiger (2004) noted, 
this push toward individual rights was also reflected in the law and policy of the 
government. An example of this was the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Act banned 
discrimination based on race in most public fora. Initially, colleges and universities were 
not subject to the anti-discrimination laws. Diversity was an institutional matter. The 
Civil Rights Act and executive orders that followed its passage changed that exemption 
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and required institutions of higher education to comply with non-discrimination laws. 
The same held true when Title IX was passed in 1972 (Geiger, 2004).  
The Civil Rights Movement was an example of a trend in society and among 
courts and law makers toward a greater emphasis on individual rights, oftentimes rooted 
in the US Constitution. The acceptance by courts of Constitutional rights, versus the use 
of contractual rights, and their application to the higher education context, created a 
complex and nuanced legal environment which regularly contradicted the desired actions 
of the higher education community. This shift from court-given deference to institutions 
necessitated the presence on campus of people who could both reactively defend colleges 
and universities and proactively help colleges and universities avoid legal troubles. In the 
rest of this section, I will present several examples of how courts used novel, at least to 
the higher education environment, rationale based in the US Constitution to alter the 
relationship between campuses, students, and faculty. This analysis of the change in 
reasoning is in keeping with the assertions made by Bickel (1974), Ruger (1997), and 
Sensenbrenner (1974) regarding the proliferation of in-house counsel on campuses. 
One of the most cited cases by higher education law scholars is the case of Dixon 
v. Alabama (1961). Dixon (1961), which was rooted in the Civil Rights Movement,
represented both a stark departure from in loco parentis and a significant shift toward 
recognizing individual rights in line with societal trends (Ruger, 1997). In Dixon (1961), 
the US Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit answered the question: Are notice and a hearing 
required at a public institution before a student can be expelled? The Court answered in 
the affirmative and, using Constitutional rationale, changed requirements in conduct 
cases involving significant penalties. 
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In Dixon (1961), African-American students from Alabama State College staged a 
sit-in at a white’s only lunch counter in Montgomery, Alabama. Following the sit-in, 
there was significant political pressure on the College’s president to expel the students. 
Ultimately, the decision fell to the State Board of Education which voted to expel the 
students. No hearing or notice was provided to the students prior to the decision (Dixon, 
1961). Because Alabama State College was a state actor, the Court found that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process applied. To decide whether notice was 
required in the Dixon case, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court had to balance 
the students’ private interest with the governmental power being used (Dixon, 1961). The 
Court found that the private interest being impacted by the expulsion was the students’ 
ability to gain admission to another public school. As a result, the student would be 
permanently damaged.   The Court additionally found that if the students were to be 
permanently impacted in such an extreme way, the government power exerted needed to 
be done in a reasonable way so that Constitutional principles would be respected. Instead 
of hearing one side of the case, the board needed to hear both sides. Therefore the 
students were entitled to notice and a hearing (Dixon, 1961). 
Dixon (1961) was a remarkable case for two primary reasons. The first reason was 
based in the outcome. Dixon (1961) articulated the requirement that a process be 
followed that allowed for the accused student to defend him or herself (Dixon, 1961). No 
longer could a college or university summarily dismiss students. Second, Dixon 
represented a fundamental shift in the means to achieving the ruling. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, prior to the early 20th century, courts would have used contract law to 
resolve cases such as Dixon (Gelber, 2014a; Gelber 2014b). Contract law could have 
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produced the same outcome in the case. However, here the Court chose to use 
Constitutional means to address an expulsion reflecting a shift in societal norms towards 
the respecting of fundamental rights (Ruger, 1997). 
 To ensure a student’s Constitutional rights, the Court created a flexible process 
for the institutions to follow. Institutions needed to provide a statement of the charges and 
an opportunity for a hearing which could be formal or informal as long as the information 
was presented in detail. The hearing itself could be adversarial, but the respondent had to 
be able to present a defense (Dixon, 1961). Absent these processes, a state institution 
could not take significant action against a student for a conduct violation. This flexibility 
presented an institution with a loose framework to follow. Professionals would be 
required to ensure a process was created and followed on campus that kept in line with 
legal requirements. In some cases, those individuals were on-campus attorneys.  
As mentioned above, much of the student discontent that occurred on campuses 
during the 1960s was based in part on institutional attempts to limit student free speech. 
Students, like greater American society, were rebelling in part against what they viewed 
as a monolithic establishment attempting to usurp fundamental rights (Thelin, 2011). 
During this time period, and into the 1970s courts, including the US Supreme Court, 
wrestled with the free speech right of students in the education context. This issue further 
complicated the legal relationship between institutions and students which had been fairly 
clear prior to this period of time. 
The First Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits any governmental entity 
from abridging a person’s right to speak freely and assemble to make their voices heard. 
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Many of the First Amendment cases from the 1960s to 1980s period concerning students 
and institutions of education centered on students who took some action involving speech 
that ran counter to the wishes of the institutions. The institution then took action to stop 
the speech, and that action was then challenged in the courts. One such case, Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), was a US Supreme Court 
case involving a public school system. While not involving an institution of higher 
education, the principles of Tinker (1969) were then applied to public higher education as 
well.  
In Tinker (1969), students wanted to wear black armbands to school to protest the 
Vietnam War. The school system objected and adopted a rule where students wearing 
armbands would be asked to remove them. If they refused, they would be suspended until 
they removed the armbands. The impacted students sued the school system alleging a 
violation of their First Amendment rights to free speech (Tinker, 1969). The school 
system argued that their policy was reasonable in that they feared the arm bands would 
create a disturbance (Tinker, 1969). 
The Supreme Court rejected the system’s arguments, deciding instead to preserve 
the students’ rights to expression, even in school. The court wrote, “…it can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” (Tinker, 1969, p. 504). The Court indicated 
that schools did have the right to control conduct subject to Constitutional limitations 
which centered on the intrusiveness of the conduct.  
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Tinker (1969) is an interesting case when applied to the higher education context. 
While overall it stands for the principle that speech cannot be regulated just based on a 
fear of disturbance, it still acknowledges that school systems do have some authority to 
control students. In higher education, the students are adults. So while Tinker’s 
fundamental holding, that the state cannot abridge free speech based on fear of a 
disturbance, applies to colleges and universities, the boundaries of the authority to control 
may be different in a higher education context.  
In 1972, three years after Tinker (1969), the Supreme Court took the principles of 
Tinker (1969) one step further and applied them to a case involving a controversial 
student group. In Healy v. James (1972), students at Central Connecticut State University 
sought approval to register a campus chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the Vietnam War underway, many people 
were suspicious of left leaning organizations. SDS was such an organization. To 
ameliorate concerns, the local chapter of the SDS vowed not to affiliate with the national 
organization. The committee charged with screening student groups approved the 
application and sent the recommendation to the University’s President. The President 
rejected the recommendation noting that SDS’ philosophy was antithetical to the school’s 
policies and that he doubted the group would truly be independent of the national 
organization (Healy, 1972). As a result, the group filed suit. 
Initially, the US District Court found that the students had been denied due 
process. Following that decision, a hearing was held and the group was not approved. 
SDS filed suit again and the case was dismissed. An appeal had the same result. The 
Supreme Court, however, strongly disagreed with the lower courts. The Court said that 
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because a college campus is a “marketplace of ideas,” a state’s requirement to uphold the 
First Amendment should be even stronger on campuses (Healy, 1972, p. 180). By not 
recognizing the campus SDS group, the Court indicated that the University’s actions 
were tantamount to disbanding the group based on its beliefs. If the group had actually 
violated a law or campus policy or was a substantial threat to campus, the institution 
would have been proper in the action it took. Absent those two occurrences, the 
University had no justification for denying the group’s recognition (Healy, 1972). 
One year after Healy (1972), the Supreme Court decided another First 
Amendment case originating from a university campus. In this case however, the Court 
was dealing with institutional action surrounding a publication by a student. In Papish v. 
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri (1973), the University expelled a student 
for publishing an “obscene” cartoon on the front of a magazine sold on campus. The 
institution said that the cartoon violated “generally accepted standards of conduct” 
(Papish, 1973). In a relatively short opinion, the Supreme Court applied Healy (1972), 
and said that by expelling the student, the University, as a state actor, discriminated 
against him based on the protected content of this cartoon. Free expression could not be 
stopped based on standards of decency alone (Papish, 1973). 
The line of cases talked about above only represent the evolution of cases based 
on one Constitutional principle—free speech. However, even within this one area of the 
law there was great change and increased complexity in line with societal changes. 
Seventy or so years prior, courts would most likely not have looked to the Constitution to 
settle these speech and association issues. They would have looked to contracts or 
contract-like documents between the institution and students (Gelber, 2014a). Thirty 
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years earlier courts would have most likely accepted the right of the institution to dictate 
the behavior of the student (Gelber, 2014a). By the mid-1970s, based on Constitutional 
principles, courts had dictated that institutions had to consider such issues as the 
intrusiveness of speech, whether a group was a substantial threat to campus, and had to 
justify whether an action taken was based on the beliefs of the person or group (Healy, 
1972; Papish, 1973; Tinker, 1969). These new complexities, along with court decisions 
rooted in Constitutional law in the areas of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process for 
students (Dixon, 1961; Goss, 1975) and Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
protections for students living in college housing (Piazzola, 1971), created a challenging 
legal environment in line with society at the time. Institutions needed individuals on staff 
who could understand and work within the confines of court decisions. In addition, 
institutions needed people who could skillfully work to prevent lawsuits and, if 
necessary, argue to a court why an institution’s policy fit into the limitations placed on 
institutional action by courts. Institutional counsel could fill that role. 
While institutions of higher education were facing the application of 
Constitutional law to their relationships with students, the societal trend toward the 
importance of respecting individual rights and liberties impacted the relationship between 
institution and faculty/employees as well. Court recognition of the individual rights of 
faculty during the 1960s and 1970s, like those of students, centered on free speech and 
due process. The McCarthy Hearings in the 1950s brought to light the intense fear of the 
Communist infiltration of American society, particularly in academia. The Vietnam War 
in the 1960s and 1970s reignited that fear (Geiger, 2004). Within this context, state 
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institutions reacted and, in doing so forced courts to balance individual freedoms with 
institutional priorities.   
An example of this balancing of institutional priorities and individual rights was 
the 1952 case of Wieman v. Updegraff.  Updegraff, a citizen of Oklahoma, sued to enjoin 
faculty and staff of Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College from assuming their 
jobs as a result of those employees not signing an oath of loyalty as required by 
Oklahoma law. The oath stated that the employee taking it was not associated with “a 
communist front or subversive organization” (Wieman, 1952, p. 186). The employees 
impacted by the suit intervened and challenged the law requiring the oaths. In its opinion 
the Supreme Court scoffed at the fact that mere association, knowingly or not, was 
grounds for disqualification for employment. The opinion noted: “to thus inhibit 
individual freedom of movement is to stifle the flow of democratic expression and 
controversy at one if its chief sources…Indiscriminate classification of innocent with 
knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power” (Wieman, 1952, p. 191).  
Another important case involving loyalty oaths came before the Supreme Court 
fifteen years after Wieman (1952). This case, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, dealt with a 
similar issue as in Wieman (1952). Unlike Wieman (1952), this case was decided based 
on free speech rationale instead of due process rationale. 
In 1962, the privately operated University of Buffalo merged with the State 
University of New York at Buffalo. New York law required that public higher education 
employees had to sign a statement indicating that they were not Communists. Keyishian 
and others who had been on the faculty at the private University of Buffalo refused to 
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sign the statement. Keyishian’s year to year contract was not renewed by SUNY Buffalo 
due to his failure to sign. The Supreme Court ruled that New York law was highly 
ambiguous and had no objective measure (Keyishian, 1965). The means of rebutting the 
assumption of membership, in the eyes of the Court, were insufficient to stand up to First 
Amendment scrutiny. Therefore the law as a whole failed due to “overbreadth” 
(Keyishian, 1965, p. 609). Institutions could not enforce the law and, in addition, could 
not take steps to ensure that faculty were not Communists.  
The fundamental argument of this section is that the shift from straightforward 
contract law as the basis for court decisions to a more nuanced Constitutional analysis 
contributed to the need for institutional counsel on campus. These two cases are prime 
examples of the increased complexity of the analysis. The loyalty oaths in both cases 
were statutory law, under the courts described in Gelber (2014a), they would have most 
likely been declared legal. However the courts in Wieman (1952) and Keyishian (1965) 
forced institutions to consider both the arbitrariness and the scope of laws and policies. 
This was a far more in-depth and technical approach that required individuals, like 
attorneys, versed in such analysis. 
Another important case that highlights the complex nature of Constitutional 
analysis in the higher education context was the 1972 case of Perry v. Sindermann. The 
case established a potential property interest in employment for non-tenured faculty. 
Perry’s (1972) initial facts were very similar to other faculty employment cases. 
Sindermann was a faculty member at Odessa Junior College in Texas. He was a non-
tenured year-to-year faculty member and part of a faculty union. Sindermann was elected 
chair of that union and placed an advertisement critical of the school’s regents’ reluctance 
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to turn Odessa into a four-year institution. Following the publishing of the article, 
Sindermann was terminated. Sindermann was not provided a hearing or a rationale for the 
termination (Perry, 1972).  
The Supreme Court noted that a year-to-year employee was not required to have a 
hearing if his or her contract was not renewed unless he or she could show that the 
decision to rehire deprived him or her of a “liberty” or “property” interest (Perry, 1972, 
p. 601). The burden was on Sindermann to show that he did indeed have a “liberty” or
“property” interest in his employment. 
Sindermann focused on language in the “Faculty Guide” that said that Odessa 
wished for faculty members to feel as if they had permanent tenure (even though there 
was no formal tenure system) as long as their teaching was good, they were cooperative, 
and were happy (Perry, 1972). In addition, Sindermann focused on a Texas college and 
university system guideline which indicated that if a person were employed with the 
system for seven or more years, he had some form of tenure (Perry, 1972). In response to 
Sindermann’s claims, the Court re-emphasized that the “property” interest Sindermann 
sought to prove was not “limited by a few rigid, technical forms” (Perry, 1972, p. 601). 
The Court followed by saying that a “property” interest might exist if there were rules or 
“mutually explicit understandings” that support a claim of a “property” interest (Perry, 
1972). The Court agreed with Sindermann’s argument and sent the case back to the 
District Court for trial. The Court finished its opinion by noting that the finding that 
Sindermann had a “property” interest would not necessarily have indicated that he should 
have been reinstated. Instead, the Court reasoned that a finding of a “property” interest 
would necessitate a formal process, i.e., a hearing before he could be terminated or not 
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renewed (Perry, 1972). This point is key in that it used the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to limit an institution’s ability to make a unilateral employment 
decision absent a process. Here again, we see a dramatic shift in analysis. Rather than 
simply relying on Sindermann’s status as a year-to-year employee according to contract 
law, the Court created a complex analysis that gave Sindermann additional rights and 
required a process before he could be terminated. 
Conclusion: Some Universal Notes on the Transition to In-house Counsel 
This chapter has provided examples of issues that contributed to the need for in-
house counsel offices on college and university campuses. Before concluding, there are 
two additional rationales that are more universal in nature and add an additional layer 
to the discussion started by Bickel (1974), Ruger (1997), and Sensenbrenner (1974). 
Lawyers in private practice are expensive. If a large institution such as the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill were to engage outside counsel for all legal 
matters, the cost, based on an hourly rate, would be prohibitively high. Hiring attorneys 
on a salaried basis allows institutions to control costs (Sensenbrenner, 1974). In addition, 
hiring staff counsel fosters a positive work environment and a sense of loyalty 
(Sensenbrenner, 1974). Many firm attorneys are focused on billable hours and bonuses. 
In-house counsel do not have to worry about billable hours and are therefore able to focus 
more on producing quality work and building relationships with campus constituents. 
This work environment also creates a sense of loyalty to the institution. In-house counsels 
allow institutions to both control costs and foster a quality working environment for staff 
members (Sensenbrenner, 1974). 
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Additional cost savings are realized by shifting regulatory work from faculty to 
attorneys. For example, Robert Scott, a former associate dean at Cornell in a 1978 article 
for Change, noted that in 1974-75, faculty at Harvard spent 60,000 hours at a cost of $8.3 
million on compliance with federal regulations (Scott, 1978). That number would be 
about $35 million in 2013 dollars. The Ohio State University in the same year spent over 
a million dollars on compliance (Scott, 1978). Instituting larger general counsel offices 
allowed these institutions to siphon off some of the compliance work from the faculty to 
attorneys to help save both monetary and personnel resources. In addition to increased 
costs, Scott noted a rise in outside review of university actions, “not only legislatures and 
federal agencies but the courts are willing to scrutinize every exercise of discretion on the 
basis of a complaint. This is the twilight of authority and autonomy” (Scott, 1978, p. 20). 
Finally, Scott’s fundamental point, and an important generalized rational and 
impetus for a general counsel’s office on campus, relates to the nature of government and 
the nature of colleges and universities. Scott noted that universities are seen as social 
leaders, by means of promoting democracy and equality. To that end, university 
governance reflects those goals. As Scott wrote: 
Most regulations seem to have been written for hierarchical management systems, 
not for horizontal collegial systems where authority is shared…The government officials 
who oversee regulations are lawyers, accountants and bureaucrats, not educators; and 
they [educators] work in staff committees, not as individuals with authority (Scott, 1978, 
p. 19).
Scott’s argument is compelling; the people making the rules that colleges and universities 
need to follow are not versed in how colleges and universities run. Regulators are 
familiar with a top-down approach, not the shared-governance, everything-is-discussed 
approach of higher education. Regulators do not fully understand issues like academic 
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freedom or tenure. In addition, courts do not understand that many faculty and 
administrators do not fully understand the language used in court decisions. This is where 
the general counsel’s role is vital. Attorneys, familiar with institutions and higher 
education can serve as a form of translator, taking regulatory or legal language and 
making it accessible to non-lawyers. In addition, attorneys can see issues, and, if 
necessary, form coalitions that non-lawyers may not have initially viewed as necessary. 
The use of outside law firms, which was the model during the first half to three-
quarters of the 20th century, was viable during a time of less nuanced regulation from all 
branches of government. Firm attorneys did their legal work and billed institutions. As 
issues became more complex, colleges and universities realized that in addition to cost 
savings, they needed individuals who were familiar with the relative peculiarities of 
academic environments and could be the interface between the hierarchical outside 
legal/regulatory world and the institution and its constituents (Scott, 1978). By hiring in-
house counsels, institutions could ensure that the attorneys became familiar with the 
environment, that the incumbents to the positions wanted to work in higher education, 
and that they were capable of serving as the bridge between the government and the 
world of higher education.  
Throughout this section on case law, I have endeavored to, through the use of 
history, both detail and expand on assertions made by higher education law practitioners 
(Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 1997; Sensenbrenner, 1974). The student and faculty rights 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which were representative of significant shifts in 
society, were not unique in the sense that courts interacted with higher education issues. 
What these movements, and society at large, did help to bring about was a substantial 
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change in what law was used when deciding cases involving students and faculty. No 
longer were courts only willing to look at statutes and contracts. Instead courts at all 
levels, in line with the philosophy of the time, applied Constitutional standards and tests 
which increased the complexity of the analysis. This required individuals who had the 
training and expertise to both respond to, and prevent legal issues from arising. Those 
individuals were, as Ruger (1997) noted, institutional counsel. 
This chapter was designed to answer the question: What examples can be offered 
to support previously made assertions that the impetus for the proliferation of in-house 
university counsel offices in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s was, in part, the result of 
increased governmental regulation, and litigation? It did so by, building on Bickel (1974), 
Ruger (1974) and Sensenbrenner (1974), demonstrating the increased amount of 
governmental regulation during the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s, and by showing how the 
application of complex Constitutional law to the relationships between faculty, students, 
and institutions in the 1960s and 1970s created an environment where contract lawyers 
were no longer sufficient.   The next chapter will take this research one step further and 
analyze, in an exploratory way, how current and former general or associate counsel view 
or viewed their role(s) within the college or university environment. The goal is to take 
the historical context above and bring it into the modern day in order to show how the 
role of the general counsel has integrated into campus bureaucracies. To complement the 
interviews, the next chapter will also put those views into context by comparing the 
resulting commentary on the role of the general counsel with the role of the academic 
dean as presented in the literature.  After exploring these issues, this dissertation will 
conclude with remaining questions and potential topics for additional research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Role of the University Counsel 
Up until this point, in the broad scheme of the history of the university general 
counsel’s office, this project has focused on the “distant” past, examining the impetus and 
early thoughts on the role of the office. In the literature concerning the role of the 
institutional general counsel, some authors either alluded to, or directly talked about, two 
main types of general counsel: the advisor or the decision maker (Beale, 1975; Bickel, 
1974, Orentlicher, 1975; Sensenbrenner, 1974). Based on conversations with the three 
attorneys, in the modern day, due primarily to the increased complexity of higher 
education law, the advisor role has shifted ever so slightly into a more active 
facilitator/resource role while the decision maker model still holds true (interviews, April, 
2014). 
This chapter looks at the modern day by describing and analyzing three interviews 
conducted with three different institutional counsels. As described in Chapter 3, these 
conversations were conducted using Oral History methodology (Kyvig & Marty, 2010; 
Ritchie, 2003). Participants were asked to relate opinions and anecdotes based on ten 
questions which are included in the Appendix. The individuals interviewed for this 
project all hold or held positions within public institutions. One individual, who will be 
referred to as Attorney 1, is currently an associate counsel at a Research One flagship 
institution in the southeast. Attorney 2 is currently in a senior position at the system level 
and previously served an as associate counsel at a Research One flagship institution in the 
southeast (the same institution as Attorney 1). Attorney 3 is a retired general counsel 
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from another, smaller Research One flagship institution located in the Deep South. As 
mentioned in Chapter Three, in addition to their expertise, these three individuals were 
chosen based on their accessibility. Two were interviewed in person and one via Skype.  
After providing some background on the three attorneys, this chapter will compare and 
contrast their views on the role of the general counsel and explain factors which could 
account for their differing views. In addition, this chapter will place those views in the 
context of institutional leadership by comparing the perceived role of the general counsel 
with that of the academic dean. 
The Interviewees 
Attorney 1. The first interview conducted was with an associate counsel at a large 
Research One institution. This individual had graduated with a Bachelor’s degree from 
the institution he now represents. In addition, members of his family had been in the 
administration at the same institution.  As a result, he has a strong affinity for his 
employer. After graduating from a top-25 law school, this individual began his practice 
with a large regional law firm. In the modern age of institutional counsel, most college 
and university attorneys, at least according to Attorney 1, follow a typical path: law 
school to associate in a firm to in-house institutional counsel (interview, April, 2014).  
Attorney 1’s primary interest coming out of law school was contractual 
agreements between corporations and businesses. While employed at the law firm, he 
spent much of his time working on high value financial transactions involving creditors 
and borrowers. After five years of practice, Attorney 1 faced a pivotal decision. As a fifth 
year associate, the expectation was that he would begin building a “book” of his own 
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clients; that is, clients he brought to the firm. He was also expected to commit to 
practicing financial transaction law for the rest of his career. Attorney 1 decided that he 
did not like the idea of having to find clients. In addition, he feared the “monotony” of 
finance law would grow tiresome (interview, April, 2014).  He was forwarded the job 
description for his current position and applied. He has been in his current position of an 
associate university counsel for almost ten years. At the time of his hiring, the counsel’s 
office at his employer had experienced a change in leadership. It was also experiencing a 
significant increase in workload. Attorney 1 was hired in the early 2000s, along with an 
attorney specializing in student issues and an attorney who specialized in technology 
issues. Since then the office has grown by seven attorneys, each with their own specialty 
and sub-specialty (interview, April, 2014). 
Attorney 2. During her interview, Attorney 2 admitted that she took an unusual 
route to her long term positions as first an associate general counsel for an institution and 
then a senior associate counsel for a state system of higher education (interview, April, 
2014).  Attorney 2 indicated that most institutional counsel start on a path very similar to 
that of Attorney 1 (interview, April, 2014). She also noted that in the late 1990s, when 
she graduated from law school, the firm to in-house counsel route was not the exclusive 
way to enter into an in-house higher education law practice setting (interview, April, 
2014). However, she followed up by saying in the modern age of relatively large 
university counsel offices, the firm to in-house path is the norm (interview, April, 2014).  
Attorney 2’s path toward the role of an associate general counsel for a Research 
One institution was in some ways in “her DNA” (interview, April, 2014). Her father was 
a college professor and her mother was an attorney (interview, April, 2014).  Attorney 2 
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majored in history and ultimately went to law school at the institution that later was her 
employer. As a history major, she enjoyed the reading, writing, critical thinking, and 
analysis that went along with working with history. This facility with writing and critical 
thinking led her to law school. While in law school, she took higher education law which 
was then taught by the institution’s general counsel. Following law school, she joined the 
institution’s Office of the University Counsel first as a clerk, then as a paralegal, then 
finally as an attorney. Unlike Attorney 1, who “came up” in a firm setting, Attorney 2 
developed her skills in an in-house counsel setting (interview, April, 2014). 
The office that Attorney 2 joined in 1994 was significantly different from the 
office twenty years later. In 1994, the office had 5 full time attorneys—the general 
counsel and four associate counsels (today the office has more than 10 full time 
attorneys). In addition, rather than being housed all together, the attorneys and clerks 
were imbedded in the offices of the institutional clients they served. There was a weekly 
staff meeting which brought the attorneys together. In addition, legal services were not 
solely the responsibility of the university counsel’s staff. Individual units also hired 
attorneys who were responsible to unit leaders as opposed to the university counsel 
(interview, April, 2014).  
In the early 2000s, the structure of Attorney 2’s office changed dramatically. A 
new university counsel consolidated the attorneys into one space and significantly 
expanded the size of the office. Attorney 2 indicated this change was the result of the 
workload tripling due to an increase in the research enterprise, technology, record 
requests from the public, and an overall increase in litigation (interview, April, 2014). 
Even though the number of lawyers and support staff increased, the workload also 
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increased making it hard for attorneys to maintain a work/life balance. It was this 
work/life issue that served as the impetus for Attorney 2’s transition from the role as a 
campus based lawyer to the system office. As will be discussed briefly later, Attorney 2 
views the role of a campus attorney and system attorney as similar in nature but different 
in practice (interview, April, 2014). 
Attorney 3. While Attorney 3 practiced at an institution which statistically 
seemed similar to the institutions of Attorney 1 and Attorney 2, her experiences and 
background were significantly different—as was her experience at her institution. 
Attorney 3 is older than Attorney 1 and Attorney 2, and is a retired general counsel. 
Attorney 3 also practiced in a far smaller general counsel’s office than Attorney 1 and 
Attorney 2.  
Attorney 3’s interest in law was rooted in her father, who was an attorney. At 
home during their evening meal, Attorney 3’s father would talk about cases he was 
working on, and often posed questions for his children to debate (interview, April, 2014). 
While this sparked Attorney 3’s interest in becoming an attorney, she was influenced by 
the social mores of the Deep South in the 1950s. In 1959, as her graduation from college 
grew closer, she approached the dean of the law school at her undergraduate institution, 
the same institution she ultimately represented, and was told that there was no place for a 
woman in law school (interview, April, 2014). 
Following graduation, Attorney 3 married, taught school, and had four children. 
In 1974, following the birth of her fourth daughter, Attorney 3 entered law school at the 
same institution which had previously rejected her. In her first year, she was one of only 
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five women to attend law school at her large state institution in the Deep South 
(interview, April, 2014). Following graduation, she joined the litigation practice of a forty 
person law firm in the same college town in which her university was located. For the 
town, a forty person firm was considered enormous. Even though the firm was highly 
respected, Attorney 3 still encountered stiff resistance to women practicing law 
(interview, April, 2014). In 1980, Attorney 3 had successfully litigated a civil case with 
the jury finding for her client and awarding damages. In a side-bar, the judge presiding 
over the case indicated that a courtroom was no place for a woman and as such he was 
going to issue a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendants, overturning the 
jury (interview, April, 2014). Attorney 3 was appalled but not surprised. 
In the late 1980s, Attorney 3’s life changed when her husband was diagnosed with 
and succumbed to terminal liver cancer. By this point in time, Attorney 3 had built up a 
reputation as a formidable litigator and attorney (interview, April, 2014). She had also 
built up contacts in the university town during her years of practice. By the late 1980s, 
the general counsel’s office at her university had been well established, mostly, according 
to Attorney 3, due to the student rights and Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and 
1970s (interview, April, 2014).  The University needed a new general counsel and 
Attorney 3 needed a more family friendly position. Attorney 3 also had a strong 
relationship with the University’s chancellor and was offered the position and held it until 
her retirement in 2003 (interview, April, 2014). Now back in private practice, Attorney 3 
serves in a senior attorney role to the firm she worked for early in her career. 
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The Role of the Institutional General Counsel 
Before starting an in-depth discussion of the attorney’s views on the role of the 
general counsel, it is important to first link back to the discussions in the previous 
chapters. Chapter Four was designed to explain assertions by Bickel (1974), Rugger 
(1997), and Sensenbrenner (1974) that increased regulation, and case law created the 
need for institutional counsel on campus. During the interviews for this chapter two of 
the three attorneys also mentioned these factors as impetuses for the establishment of 
counsel offices on campus. Attorney 1, in his April, 2014 interview noted: 
I think there are a few primary drivers, one of which is the growth in regulations.  
Higher education institutions have really…since the ’60s and ‘70s, really… 
started to come under increased regulatory scrutiny from the federal government, 
from state regulatory bodies, and even here locally, municipal bodies with land 
use regulations, parking, and related regulations.  You almost could have a law 
office devoted solely to regulatory work that would fully employ 11 attorneys.  I 
think that trend is going to continue. 
In fact, I should also throw in there international regulations, because like many 
other leading research institutions and ones with very robust study abroad 
programs, we are in just about every country across this globe either with study 
abroad or research or both.    
This sentiment was echoed by Attorney 3 (interview, April, 2014). 
The views. Attorney 1 and Attorney 2 described the role of the institutional 
counsel, at least at the associate counsel level, as someone who facilitates a course of 
action. In many instances, an institutional client representing an office wants an 
attorney’s help in resolving an issue. While it is an institutional counsel’s job to help the 
client resolve the issue, an attorney has to realize that he or she represents the university 
as a whole and not just the individual client. This is where the “facilitator” role comes 
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into play. As Attorney 1 noted, “you just realize that this deal’s not going to get done 
unless…you, as the attorney, put together the building blocks to make a deal happen” 
(interview, April, 2014). Institutional counsel has to have, as Attorney 1 described it, a 
“tough conversation” with an institutional client over how any course of action would 
impact other units within the university (interview, April, 2014). Rather than say, “here’s 
what you could do,” the attorney creates a process by which others are consulted and a 
course of action agreed upon (interview, April, 2014). 
Attorney 1 gave an example of a project to improve cellular service on his 
campus. His campus’ information technology office wanted to install university owned 
cell towers on various buildings across campus (interview, April, 2014). The campus’ IT 
office would then lease space on the towers to the various cell carriers. The carriers 
supported the plan. When approached to help work out the contract, Attorney 1 had to 
help IT officials understand that there were other offices that had to be consulted 
(interview, April, 2014). Over the course of several months, representatives of several 
offices within the facilities department were brought into the conversation to discuss 
utilities infrastructure and maintenance. In addition, representatives of the office that 
administers campus space had to be consulted. In essence, what IT had thought would be 
a quick process was significantly lengthened because more consultation was needed 
(interview, April, 2014). However, in the end, the attorney facilitated an internal 
conversation which ultimately led to the success of the project. Here the attorney did not 
advise an outcome, he facilitated one (interview, April, 2014). As Attorney 1 noted, his 
role is and was not to stop projects or ideas, but to point out issues and “let projects move 
forward or not, naturally” (interview, April, 2014). In the end, Attorney 1 said that his 
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role was to help “campus constituents…reach a happy spot on a fairly substantial 
infrastructure project” (interview, April, 2014). 
Another example of this facilitator role was when Attorney 1’s institution decided 
to renovate its football stadium (interview, April, 2014). Attorney 1’s institution is a 
Division 1 school with a strong football program. As part of a stadium project, and in 
order to raise revenue, the athletic department wanted to be able to sell alcohol in new 
luxury boxes to be built during the renovation. After being approached with this request, 
Attorney 1 and his colleagues realized that the request might conflict with the campuses’ 
overall commitment to reduce underage drinking (interview, April, 2014). The general 
counsel’s office had to “tee up” conversations between athletics and student affairs to get 
the issue resolved (interview, April, 2014). To Attorney 1, the fundamental role of the 
general counsel’s office is to point out risks to clients and help the client work through 
those risk or issues, not to decide for the clients how to proceed.  
Attorney 2 has a similar philosophy and related a similar anecdote based on the 
notion of facilitating a resolution. During the 2011-12 academic year, Attorney 2 was 
asked to co-chair her university’s Title IX self-study in the area of athletics (interview, 
April, 2014). While Title IX is now well known for its impact on sexual harassment 
reporting, prevention, and adjudication on college campuses, the law was and still is in 
place to ensure, among other things, parity in athletic opportunities for women on college 
and university campuses (interview, April, 2014). Attorney 2’s panel was charged with 
looking at the then current situation on campus regarding gender and athletics and to 
make recommendations to the athletic director for potential changes (interview, April, 
2014). Attorney 2’s co-chair was a senior administrator in the athletic department. 
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At this point it is important to ask, if the argument being made is that the role of 
an institutional counsel is that of a facilitator, why was Attorney 2 put in a position of 
authority as co-chair of the committee? On her campus, Attorney 2 was considered an 
expert on Title IX in athletics (interview, April, 2014). From her early days as a clerk in 
the then decentralized University Counsel’s Office, Title IX had been an area in which 
she specialized. She not only held the institutional memory on Title IX, she had a facility 
with the intricacies of the law and the expectations of regulators. As she said, “you’re 
there because you have some legal expertise” (interview, April, 2014). In this case, she 
used her expertise to help facilitate recommendations on how her institution could better 
comply with Title IX (interview, April, 2014).  
Both Attorney 1 and Attorney 2 indicated one major exception to the institutional 
counsel as facilitator philosophy—the blatant violation of laws (interview, April, 2014). 
Attorney 1 directly indicated that if an approach by a client were to violate laws or 
regulations, it was the duty of the institutional counsel to step in and tell the client they 
could not proceed. Attorney 2 agreed with that approach. Both Attorney 1 and 2 agreed 
that it would then be the attorney’s role to help the client reach his or her goal while 
staying in compliance with laws or regulations (interview, April, 2014). Attorney 1 noted 
that if a proposal from a campus client violated FERPA, HIPAA or other regulatory 
schemes, he “would not allow a deal to go forward if it did not comply” (interview, April, 
2014). 
Attorney 3 presented a significantly different picture of the role of the general 
counsel’s office. She acknowledged that part of her role was to advise, but she said that 
both administrative duties and managing and pursuing or defending litigation were the 
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office’s primary responsibilities (interview, April, 2014). For Attorney 3, advising a 
client often meant her choosing a course of action. Unlike Attorneys 1 and 2 who felt that 
it was the client’s responsibility to come to a decision, Attorney 3 understood that her 
“advice” would be followed. She based her views on the fact that people respected her 
familiarity with the institution. She went to the school for her degrees, she was more 
experienced and more mature than most administrators, and all of the chancellors she 
served under were close personal friends (interview, April, 2014). 
On the administrative side, Attorney 3 indicated that a great deal of her time was 
spent ensuring that due process requirements were followed for both students and 
employees. As she said, “We gave everyone a hearing on everything” (interview, April, 
2014). Hearings were clearly time-consuming. Litigation also played a considerable role 
in her daily practice. Attorney 3 believed that potential plaintiffs saw her institution has 
having deep pockets. She also alluded to the idea that people viewed her institution as 
media adverse due to issues it had during the Civil Rights Movement. As a result, people 
believed that if they sued, the university would settle (interview, April, 2014).  
One example of a law suit which she had to defend was an employment 
discrimination suit based, ironically, in the institution’s law school (interview, April, 
2014). The law school had done a search for a legal writing professor. The two finalists 
for the position were an older woman (around 60) who had a law degree and a PhD and a 
33-year-old woman with just a law degree. The older woman had taught English but not 
law. The younger woman had been a permanent law clerk for a federal judge. The 
University hired the younger woman based on her actual experience. The older woman 
sued under alleging age discrimination (interview, April, 2014). After a six day trial the 
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University lost, in part, according to Attorney 3, due to hostility from two African-
American jurors. The University appealed to the Fifth Circuit and won on appeal 
(interview, April, 2014). Preparing for the trial, traveling to the trial site, trying the case, 
and later pursuing the appeal took a great deal of time for an office of only two people. 
This was just one example of the litigation Attorney 3 faced during her career (interview, 
April, 2014).  
Regardless of the differences in views on the role of the institutional counsel, 
there were two significant commonalities. First, they all felt they needed to work 
zealously for the benefit of their individual institutions. Second, they all agreed that the 
amount and nature of the work of general counsels offices had grown and diversified 
since the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s (interview, April, 2014). It is how offices responded to that 
work where the discrepancies between Attorney 1 and 2’s approach and the approach of 
Attorney 3 lie. 
Explaining the Differing Views 
To reconcile the different views of the role of a general counsel’s office related by 
Attorney 1 and 2, and Attorney 3, there are two key factors that need to be considered: 
the nature of the individual campus and its leadership, and the structure of the office 
itself. Each will be discussed in turn. 
The nature of the individual campus and its leadership. The university where 
both Attorney 1 and 2 work/worked is a campus where shared governance is respected 
(interview, April, 2014). All classes of employees, from faculty to administrators, have 
representatives who serve on governance committees. This university is also extremely 
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decentralized, meaning individual colleges, schools, and units have a significant amount 
of autonomy over their individual operations, budgets, personnel, and policy (interview, 
April, 2014). The central university administration plays the important role of 
coordinating the units, setting the overall mission of the institution, managing the politics 
of a public university, and supporting the schools and colleges. Both Attorney 1 and 
Attorney 2 noted that the diffusion of authority is what has helped the institution succeed 
(interview, April, 2014). 
While Attorney 3’s institution is similar to that of Attorney 1 and 2, in that it, too, 
is a public flagship research university, it is smaller and from the outset has had more 
decision making power centralized in its provost and chancellor (interview, April, 2014). 
Throughout its history, according to Attorney 3, and in particularly during the Civil 
Rights Movement (as mentioned earlier, Attorney 3’s university is in the Deep South), 
decision making authority was vested in the central administration, not the units. As 
Attorney 3 said, the “institution believes in ‘shared governance...’ but the Chancellor and 
Provost control decisions” (interview, April, 2014). 
At an institution like that of Attorney 1 and Attorney 2, an authoritarian office of 
the general counsel would not be a viable model. The office’s clients are accustomed to 
making decisions based on the nuances of their individual schools or programs. They 
would most likely view a general counsel or associate general counsel taking a decision 
making approach to their work as an intrusion and overstep on the part of the central 
administration. Given the model of governance and institutional culture of Attorney 1 and 
2’s institution, the facilitator model is the most appropriate. Contrast that with the more 
centralized culture of Attorney 3’s institution. At Attorney 3’s university, the culture 
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allows for more centralized authority. By Attorney 3’s account, units expect decisions to 
come from the central university administration (interview, April, 2014). This culture 
would lend itself more toward the institutional counsel suggesting or, in extreme cases, 
mandating a course of action, and the units following that recommendation. In an 
organization like Attorney 3’s institution, there is little-to-no need for facilitation on the 
part of institutional counsel. 
The structure of the office. Another key factor in the nature of the role of the 
general counsel’s office, as gleaned from the conversations with the three attorneys, is the 
size and structure of the individual general counsel’s offices (interview, April, 2014). As 
mentioned earlier, Attorney 3’s office was small with only two attorneys on staff. With 
challenges such as NCAA investigations, federal investigations, and general litigation, 
Attorney 3 and her staff did not have the time to facilitate campus discussions about 
potential issues. While trying to practice Beale (1974), Daane (1985), Mosier & Mosier 
(1989) and Sensenbrenner’s (1974) idea of “preventive law,” Attorney 3 lamented that 
sometimes she did not have the time to focus on proactive policy (interview, April, 
2014). 
Attorneys 1 and 2 work/worked in a significantly different environment.  Under 
the laws of their state, any litigation against their institution is managed by the 
institution’s general counsel’s office but is actually litigated by the state’s Office of the 
Attorney General (interview, April, 2014). In a situation where their university is sued, in 
essence the institutional attorneys become the clients, and the Attorney General’s Office, 
the lawyers. This model alleviates much of the litigation pressure Attorney 3 felt. In 
addition to not having to litigate, the size of Attorney 1 and Attorney 2’s office was far 
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larger than Attorney 3’s. At its height, which is in the modern day, Attorney 1 and 2’s 
office had over ten attorneys, several paralegals, and additional support staff (interview, 
April, 2014). While both Attorney 1 and 2 indicated that the workload was still 
substantial even with a large staff, the mere presence of many attorneys, each with one or 
two specialties, allowed for more diffusion of work across the office, which in turn gave 
individual attorneys the ability to spend more time with specific campus clients and 
issues (interview, April, 2014).  
Another important component that differentiates the general counsel’s office on 
Attorney 1 and 2’s campus versus Attorney 3’s campus is the hierarchy within the office 
itself. While Attorney 3 was the general counsel on her campus, she only had one 
associate counsel (interview, April, 2014). The general counsel’s office at Attorney 1 and 
2’s campus had a general counsel, associate general counsels, and assistant general 
counsels (interview, April, 2014). A model like that creates an environment where the 
actual general counsel is able to deal with high profile issues while advising the president 
and provost. Lower level problems can be addressed by associate and assistant general 
counsels. Take for example the anecdote Attorney 1 shared about the cell towers. On 
Attorney 3’s campus, she would have most likely had to play a role in that decision. On 
Attorney 1’s campus, the IT office would not have considered contacting the general 
counsel herself (interview, April, 2014). Instead, they contacted Attorney 1, who could 
take the time and facilitate an institutional discussion of the issue. As these interviews 
have shown, size and structure of the office is a factor in the role attorneys play on any 
given campus (interview, April, 2014). 
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A Note on the Role of the General Counsel’s Office on the System Level 
While this project focuses on the role of the counsel on the college campus, 
before concluding the discussion of the role of the institutional counsel, I would be 
remiss if I did not touch on the role of the counsel within a system office. As mentioned 
in the introduction to the attorneys interviewed, Attorney 2 moved from a campus based 
position into a similar role at the same institution’s system office. She indicated that 
while the issues she works with changed, the facilitative nature of her role has not 
changed (interview, April, 2014). On campus, Attorney 2 dealt with Title IX, students, 
and some employment issues. At the system level, she currently does the same type of 
work but serves as support for smaller, less financially resourced campuses in the system. 
A large part of her work is also supporting the system’s Board of Governors. She 
indicated that this work requires a great deal more political thinking since the Board is a 
political entity. Attorney 2 noted, “There's a political component to the job here that is 
not so direct...as it was on the campuses” (interview, April, 2014). The work also requires 
that she think in terms of how she can facilitate a centralized or legislative approach to an 
issue. Here again, her role is not to make decisions but to facilitate people coming 
together to make decisions that impact many campuses and constituents—a similar role 
to an on campus counsel, but on a larger and perhaps more sensitive scale (interview, 
April, 2014). 
The preceding sections in this chapter were designed to explore the question: How 
do institutional counsels view their roles within the institutional bureaucracy?  This 
question was addressed through interviews with attorneys who either represent or 
represented institutions of higher education. Through the use of open-ended questions 
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designed to elicit descriptive responses, data was collected which helped answer the 
research question. The results of the interviews show that an attorney’s view of his or her 
role depends on his or her individual background, the nature of the campus, and the 
structure of the office in which he or she works. 
 Oral History research is by its very nature subjective (Ritchie, 2003). The data 
and conclusions in the preceding sections are therefore subjective as well, in that the 
opinions of the interviewees were based on their personal experiences. The next section 
of this chapter is designed to provide additional context for those opinions by comparing 
and contrasting the interviewees’ opinions on the role of the general counsel with 
accepted literature on the role of the academic dean, another senior position in institutions 
of higher education. This context is important as it provides an additional frame in which 
to look at the research question which guides this chapter.   
General Counsels in Context: Institutional Counsel vs. the Academic Dean 
As mentioned in Chapter One of this dissertation, there has been relatively little 
written in the literature of higher education on the role of the general counsel. While this 
chapter has explored perceptions of the role of the general counsel through interviews, it 
is important to provide some comparative context for the general counsel position within 
the bureaucracy of modern higher education. In order to accomplish this goal, this section 
will briefly compare the role of the general counsel to the role of the academic dean. The 
role of the dean was chosen because, like the general counsel, it is a senior level position 
within an institution of higher education—reporting to either the president, in the case of 
a small liberal arts college, or the provost at a larger university (Amherst College, 2012; 
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UNC, 2013b). In addition, the role of the dean has some striking similarities to the 
general counsel roles, but also some stark differences. There is also a significant corpus 
of literature on the role of the dean. 
In 1930, Herbert Hawkes, then Dean of Columbia College at Columbia University 
wrote “[t]here is no such thing as a standardized dean” (Gould, 1964, p. 9). Hawkes was 
essentially saying that one could not take a dean from one institution and insert him or 
her into the deanship at another institution and expect the same results. Individuals who 
accept dean positions come from varied backgrounds. Like dean roles, the same can be 
said for individuals who enter the in-house practice of higher education law. As noted in 
the interviews, attorneys who join university counsel offices often times come from 
various practice background and have varied interests. Attorney 1, for example came 
from a financial practice backgrounds, while Attorney 3 was a litigator (interviews, April, 
2014). In a similar vein, an academic dean could come from a field such as sociology or a 
hard science like physics. In both instances, both in-house counsel and deans can bring 
unique perspectives to their roles. 
While the individuals who eventually hold dean and in-house counsel positions 
may come from different practices or scholarship fields, they are similar in the fact that, 
for the most part, there is a set path to follow to either the dean or in-house counsel 
positions (interview, April, 2014; Wolverton, et al., 2001). As both Attorney 1 and 2 
noted in their interviews, the most common means to an associate counsel or general 
counsel position is to first gain experience in a law firm setting (interviews, April, 2014). 
The firm environment allows attorneys to learn practical skills to use later in their career. 
Deans follow a similar path. In a 2001 monograph on the changing nature of the dean 
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position, Mimi Wolverton and her co-authors discuss a 1981 book by V.C. Morris which 
suggested paths to a deanship (Wolverton et al., 2001). The most common of Morris’ 
paths was “professional ascension” (Wolverton et al., 2001, p. 10). “Professional 
ascension” involved faculty members working their way through the ranks from assistant 
professor to associate professor to professor and then to a deanship, or gaining tenure 
then going on to an administrative track. Like the law firm experience for attorneys, in 
that as attorneys stay at a firm longer they get more and more independent responsibility, 
progression through the faculty ranks allowed prospective deans the opportunity to gain 
experience in both in understanding faculty issues and in working with colleagues. In 
addition, as the attorneys interviewed noted, the most common path to an in-house 
counsel position was through a firm (interviews, April, 2014). A 1964 study showed that 
most deans had, like general counsels, progressed through the ranks. The study showed 
that 82 percent of deans had established academic careers and ascended through the 
faculty ranks before becoming a dean (Wolverton et al., 2001).  
To understand a primary difference between the role of a dean and the role of a 
general counsel it is important to understand the history of the office of the dean on 
college and university campuses. The first dean at a US college or university was 
appointed in 1870 at Harvard (Dibden, 1968). The Board of Governors, along with 
President Eliot, deemed that the President of the University had too much to do (Dibden, 
1968). The “Dean of the College Faculty” was appointed to preside over faculty meetings 
and to deal with students, both in admitting them and disciplining them. In addition, the 
dean was charged with administering aid programs and certifying students for graduation 
(Dibden, 1968).  
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Between the late 19th and early-mid 20th centuries the role of the dean included 
both administrative and teaching responsibilities (Wolverton et al., 2001). However, by 
the time World War II started, deans “actively supervised curricula, faculty, and budgets, 
with less of their time devoted to interaction with students” (Wolverton et al., 2001, p. 
13). By the 1960s, presidents had delegated significant administrative authority to the 
academic dean due to “expansion problems” and “public scrutiny” (Wolverton et al., 
2001, p. 14). In essence, presidents had to deal with external issues and did not have the 
time to address internal academic problems. By the 1960s, the delegated functions of the 
dean had expanded to include: directing the educational activities of the institution, being 
the chief advisor to the president, formulating educational policies, developing the budget 
for either the academic enterprise of the institution or his or her academic unit, 
supervising curriculum and instruction, and finally the hiring and review of faculty 
(Dibden, 1968). The position evolved even further in the 1970s and 1980s when finding 
economic efficiencies became a priority for institutions (Wolverton et al., 2001).  
The shifts noted above are another key similarity between the general counsel and 
the academic dean. The previous chapter presented justification for the argument that 
external forces created the need for an in-house legal practice on campus. Wolverton et 
al. (2001) and Dibden (1968) were essentially making the same argument—that is that 
external forces, growth, and the ramifications of that growth created the need for the 
academic dean to take some delegated authority from an institution’s president. While the 
basic impetus for the creation of the general counsel and the dean might be similar, as 
will be discussed below, that issue of delegated authority is a key difference between the 
general counsel and the academic dean.  
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The office of the college dean is far older than the office of the general counsel. It 
has therefore become far more institutionalized within the bureaucracy of higher 
education. The institutionalization and evolution of the dean’s office has also resulted in 
substantial delegated authority which general counsel offices do not have (interviews, 
April, 2014; Wolverton et al., 2001). Deans have the authority to hire faculty and set 
courses of action regarding programs (Dibden, 1968; Wolverton, et al., 2001). Most 
importantly, deans have the ability to allocate both financial and facility resources to 
programs and people (Dibden, 1968; Wolverton, et al., 2001). These powers allow deans 
to alter how institutions function. General counsels and general counsel’s offices do not 
have this inherent authority. Their function is to serve and advise institutional clients like 
dean’s offices (interviews, April 2014). Attorney 3 indicated that often her advice was 
followed by her campus clients (interview, April, 2014). While she may have had 
significant sway with decision makers, in the end the client chose to follow her advice 
and most likely communicated the course of action to either internal or external 
constituents. This power to directly cause change is the key distinction between the 
purposes of a general counsel versus a dean. 
The general counsel, particularly at a large institution, also has a significantly 
larger scope of involvement in university affairs. A dean at a large institution has primary 
responsibility for his or her college or school (Wolverton et al., 2001). Institutional 
counsel are involved with virtually every college, school, non-academic unit, or in some 
cases, healthcare enterprise on campus (interviews, April, 2014). This scope of 
responsibility is also a key distinction between the offices. 
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Regardless of the range of responsibility both offices, as evidenced by the 
interviews for the general counsel’s office or by the literature for the office of the dean, 
the individuals who hold the offices have to be consensus builders and facilitators 
(Dibden, 1968; Gould, 1964; interview, April, 2014; Tucker & Bryan, 2001; Wolverton 
et al., 2001). While the dean holds considerable delegated authority, as Dibden (1968) 
noted: “the faculty has a right to be consulted and to make decisions on educational 
questions…A dean succeeds with the consent of the governed” (Dibden, 1968, p. 65). In 
order to be successful in a tenure system, a dean has to facilitate agreement, or at least 
acceptance, on the part of his or her faculty. As noted during the interviews with 
institutional counsel, the same facilitation and consensus building skills are needed when 
negotiating issues between and among departments.  
The office of the academic dean and institutional counsel both share senior status 
within an institutional hierarchy (Amherst College, 2012; UNC, 2013b). In addition, both 
positions have a general path individuals follow to gain their posts (interviews, April 
2014; Wolverton et al., 2001). Both positions were also conceived out of necessity due to 
external pressures on the institution (Bickel, 1974; Dibden, 1968; Ruger, 1997; 
Sensenbrenner, 1974). The positions also require similar consensus building and 
facilitation skills (interviews, April, 2014; Wolverton et al., 2001). However, because of 
its history and delegated authority, the office of the academic dean has a far greater 
ability to affect an outcome reflective of its incumbent. In addition, academic deans have 
the ability to take unilateral action in the academic arena (Dibden, 1968; Wolverton et al., 
2001). General counsel, as evinced by the interviews conducted for this dissertation, do 
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not have unilateral authority; their position within the hierarchy is one of consultation 
(interviews, April, 2014). 
The discussion in the preceding section was designed to provide a point of 
comparison for the role of the general counsel, as articulated by the interviewees, within 
some of the accepted literature of higher education, specifically on the role of the 
academic dean. As alluded to in Chapter Three, one criticism of Oral History 
Methodology is that it can be subjective. One way to counter that subjectivity, as noted in 
Ritchie (2003) and Kyvig & Marty (2010) is to provide historical context for the Oral 
History. The discussion of the general counsel versus the academic dean is an example of 
that historical context. In addition, comparison with the dean role provides an additional 
insight into role of the general counsel by placing this new area of inquiry up against an 
area of study which is well established. This discussion, along with the results of the 
interviews above, all help provide greater awareness of the role of the general counsel 
within an institutional bureaucracy.       
Concluding Observations 
In addition to specifically addressing the interviewees’ views of the role of the 
general counsel’s office, the interview protocol for this project also asked questions 
relating to challenges facing general counsel’s offices and how the interviewees saw 
those offices evolving over the next ten to twenty years. It was with these types of 
questions where the Oral History Methodology was not overly effective. The 
interviewees each took the questions to have different meanings. For example, when 
asked about challenges Attorney 3 took the question to mean while she was practicing. 
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As such, she responded with NCAA issues and federal investigations (interview, April, 
2014). Attorney 1 answered in more global terms emphasizing the ebb and flow of work, 
changing priorities of institutions, the balancing of urgent and non-urgent matters, and 
prioritizing work (interview, April, 2014).  
Similarly, when talking about the future of the general counsel’s office on 
campuses, the attorneys had significantly different responses. Attorney 3 talked about 
new areas of law that campuses will need to face, i.e., Title IX in the area of sexual 
misconduct and the Americans With Disabilities Act, while Attorney 2 talked the need 
for more client counseling and dealing with more interdisciplinary issues (interview, 
April, 2014). Attorney 1 felt that general counsels would have to deal with online and 
international education issues (interview, April, 2014). While methodology used for these 
interviews and the ultimate outcome makes it difficult to reconcile these views, possible 
explanations could be again, the nature of each person’s campus environment, and the 
attorneys’ individual backgrounds and approaches to the practice of law. 
This chapter was intended to present, discuss, and compare and contrast three 
different in-house university counsels views on the role of college and university counsel 
within an institutional bureaucracy.  While the methods may have made the discussion 
more difficult, the ultimate outcome showed that the campus environment and structure 
of the counsel’s office play a significant part in the role that attorneys have on campus. In 
addition, the comparison of the general counsel role to that of the academic dean 
provided additional insight into the counsel’s role within an institutional bureaucracy. 
The next and final chapter, will conclude this dissertation by looking back at the initial 
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hypotheses, methodology, and discuss remaining questions and potential topics for 
additional research. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Concluding Thoughts 
A dissertation such as this one, in addition to being well written and researched, 
has to provide the reader with some form of knowledge or analysis which is either new in 
its origin or expands upon previous literature in a novel way. This project was designed 
to accomplish both of those goals. First, through the use of documentary evidence, this 
dissertation fully expanded on assertions which had not previously been explained in 
significant detail (Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 1997; Sensenbrenner, 1974). Specifically, this 
dissertation addressed the question: What examples can be offered to support previously 
made assertions that the impetus for the proliferation of in-house university counsel 
offices in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was, in part, the result of increased governmental 
regulation and litigation?  Second, this project, for the first time, used a qualitative, 
interview based approach to understand how institutional counsel view or viewed their 
roles on campus. While this data was exploratory and limited in scope, as discussed later 
in this chapter, it did present a novel approach to the issue which could be expanded upon 
in later research. In addition, this project placed the role of the general counsel in context 
by comparing it with the role of a dean as presented in established literature. 
Chapter Four answered the first research question by elaborating on previous 
literature which asserted that both courts’ consideration of cases involving faculty and 
student rights, and increased regulation on the part of federal and state governments, 
necessitated in-house legal practices on campuses (Bickel, 1974; Ruger, 1997; 
Sensenbrenner, 1974). Chapter Four provided concrete examples of increased regulations 
on the part of the federal and state governments. Chapter Four also detailed the 
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progression of courts’ relationships with colleges and universities from one based on 
contract law, to providing institutions with significant deference, to applying 
Constitutional principles to disputes involving faculty and students. 
Chapter Five answered the second research question of this dissertation: How do 
institutional counsels view their roles within the institutional bureaucracy? Chapter Five 
found that two of the three attorneys interviewed saw their role, not as passive advisers, 
nor decision makers, but as active facilitators working with campus clients to find the 
best and most comprehensive approach to remedying a client’s issue (interviews, April, 
2014). Attorney 3, through her decision-maker approach to her general counsel position, 
showed that there is no absolute when discussing the role of an institutional counsel 
(interview, April, 2014). Chapter Five also showed that the nature of campus leadership 
and the structure of the office on any given campus also impact the role of institutional 
attorneys. Additionally, Chapter Five provided insight into the role of the institutional 
counsel by comparing and contrasting the opinions of the interviewees with established 
literature on the role of the academic dean. This comparison provided an additional, more 
proven frame with which to analyze the interview data. 
While the ultimate outcome of the interview portion of this study was consistent 
with my initial hypotheses, after analyzing the data, I believe that my adherence to strict 
Oral History principles may have hampered the consistency of my data. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Oral History interviews call for broad, open-ended questions and discourages 
follow-up from the interviewer (Ritchie, 2003). The goal is to allow for a story to be told. 
The open-ended questions, from my perspective, were fairly clear. Unfortunately, the 
interviewees took questions to have different meanings. For example, two of the 
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interviewees took the question: “What are the greatest challenges you faced as a General 
Counsel?” as a broad question about the field at large. The other attorney took it as it was 
written and focused on her specific practice (interview, April, 2014). This made 
reconciling the data difficult.  
When I was drafting Chapter Five, I began to think that one additional factor that 
could determine how an attorney viewed his or her role was their individual personality. 
The Oral History interviews provided insight into the individual attorney’s mind-set. I 
decided not to include that discussion because I did not feel I had the training or 
competency in psychology to make that analysis. Had the questions been more specific, I 
could have focused the conversation more on issues I have the expertise to discuss. 
In the end, this study may have been enhanced through the use of a more 
structured interview protocol with very specific questions and an interviewer who made 
sure that the interviewees answered those questions. The problem with that approach is 
that the anecdotes may not have been as rich (Kyvig & Marty, 2010, Ritchie, 2003). 
Information about the perceived role of the in-house university counsel could also have 
been obtained in the same manner as Geary (1975), Ripps (1980), and Thompson 
(1977)—through the use of surveys. The problem with qualitative surveys is that the 
researcher is not there to ensure questions are being answered in the way he or she 
intended. Surveys produce the same issue as the Oral History approach did, although 
probably with less detail. Quantitative surveys, most likely, would not provide detailed 
and nuanced enough information. For a project like this, the personal interaction 
component is key. If someone else were to undertake a similar project, I would 
recommend the use of a more structured interview protocol. 
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Another difficulty encountered was an inability to locate actual documentation 
from a college or university showing why the institutional general counsel’s office was 
created. While Attorney 3, during her interview, indicated that increased regulation, and 
litigation were primary drivers of the need for counsel, it was difficult to find any official 
documentation verifying that opinion. I was able to obtain a budget statement from the 
University of Mississippi which indicated an attorney was brought on staff in 1978. 
Unfortunately, the document did not indicate why. At a The University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill, I was able to locate newspaper articles from as early as the late 1970s 
discussing the institution’s attorney (then referred to as an assistant to the chancellor). 
However, there was no archival information on the appointment of that individual or the 
transition of that person into the University Counsel role. One explanation could also be, 
as communicated to me by a former provost of The University of Mississippi, that 
institutions included money for an institutional counsel’s office in omnibus budgets and 
board members either did not discuss or choose to raise the issue when the budget was 
approved (G.W. Walton, personal communication, August, 30, 2014). In essence adding 
institutional counsel was an administrative action which did not require the type of 
documentation which would end up in an archive.  
This project was meant to provide background and baseline information to serve 
as a springboard for a more detailed look into the dynamics between campus counsel 
offices and college and university campuses. Additional studies could expand this study 
by asking the same questions but taking a different or refined methodological approach. 
In addition, a researcher might want to undertake the tangential question of how other 
administrators or units view the role of the campus general counsel. Another interesting 
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study would be to find a way to quantify just how much actual influence campus counsel 
have on decision-making on campus. On the documentary side of this dissertation, a 
researcher might want to look at how case law from the 1980s to the present has 
influenced the practice of college and university in-house counsel. In addition, a study to 
expand on the comparison with the academic dean could be undertaken to compare the 
role of the institutional counsel compares to that of other senior on-campus leadership. 
Needless to say, the topic of institutional counsel is a deep and under-researched area of 
study in the field of higher education. 
From as far back as the Dartmouth College case in 1819, which was an early court 
case involving an institution of higher education, to the present day, the law has impacted 
college and university campuses. As courts have changed their methods of analysis and 
governments increased their regulatory requirements, the need for lawyers to help 
colleges and universities navigate the processes associated with litigation and regulation 
has grown exponentially. Through the use of documentary analysis and interviews, this 
dissertation has sought to provide some additional and detailed insight into the 
foundations of the in-house legal practices on college and university campuses. There is 
no doubt in my mind that as the years move forward, the size of the offices and 
complexity of the issues they face will continue to grow. Just as higher education 
scholars have looked extensively into the roles and persona of presidents, provosts, and 
deans, it is my hope that soon those that study higher education will turn their attention to 
general counsels, for they, too, represent an important component of the operation and 
governance of colleges and universities. 
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Dear Sir or Madam: 
I am writing to request your participation in an historical research study designed 
to understand the impetus for, and current role of, the office of the general counsel on 
college and university campuses. This study is the culminating activity in my Doctor of 
Philosophy program in Higher Education at the University of Kentucky. 
Past studies of the office of the general counsel have focused on survey data. In 
this project I am taking a more qualitative approach utilizing historical documents and 
Oral History. An Oral History approach to a topic seeks to document an individual’s past 
experiences and recollections of an event or series of events. I am interested in discussing 
with you how you developed a professional interest in higher education law, how you 
ended up working in a college or university environment, what your role was, what the 
role of your office was, and finally how and if you saw or see the role of the general 
counsel changing over time. 
Oral History sessions are designed to present the subject with open ended 
questions and to allow the subject to relate information in as unencumbered a way as 
possible. Due to the limited scope of this project, I foresee this conversation as lasting no 
longer than an hour and a half.  
Our conversation will be recorded for transcription. In the actual dissertation only 
general information will be used to identify the source of the data i.e. “former associate 
general counsel at a large public university.” Following the successful defense of the 
project all transcripts and recordings will be destroyed. I am open to meeting with you at 
a time and place of your choosing or via electronic methods such as Skype. 
My research is being supervised by Dr. John Thelin, Professor of Education and 
Public Policy at the University of Kentucky. If you have any questions or concerns that I 
cannot address please feel free to contact Dr. Thelin at john.thelin@uky.edu. 
It is my sincere hope that you will agree to participate in this project. An Oral 
History approach to the role of the college/university general counsel’s office is a novel 
one. I have no doubt that the information you provide will be invaluable to this endeavor. 
Please feel free to contact me with any questions. I look forward to talking with you soon. 
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Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
The Law Comes to Campus: The Historical Underpinnings and Current Role of the College and 
University General Counsel’s Office 
WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH? 
You are being invited to take part in a research study about the history and current role of the Office of the 
General Counsel on college and university campuses. If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be 
one of about 4 people to do so.   
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY? 
The person in charge of this study is Jason A. Block, M.S.Ed, JD of University of Kentucky Department of 
Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation. He is being guided in this research by Dr. John Thelin, 
University Professor of Education. There may be other people on the research team assisting at different 
times during the study. 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY? 
The purpose of this study is to gain insight into the role of the college or university counsel on the modern 
day college or university campus. Information gleaned from this study will be used to expand the 
knowledge base regarding the campus attorney and his or her role within the bureaucracy of institutions of 
higher education. 
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST? 
The research procedures will be conducted via telephone using Oral History interview methodology and at 
a time convenient for the Oral History interviewee. Your one-time participation should require 45-60 
minutes. The interview will be recorded for transcription.  
WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO? 
You will be asked to participate in an Oral History interview with Mr. Block. You will be asked a series of 
questions about your professional background, how you came into a general counsel or associate general 
counsel role and you opinions on the role of the Office of the General Counsel. You may also be asked to 
share, in as much detail as you are comfortable giving, anecdotes to explain your opinions. Your answers 
will be audio recorded for accuracy. Following the interview you will be provided with a transcript and 
asked to correct any errors or clarify any statements you deem necessary. 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS? 
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would 
experience in everyday life. 
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? 
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If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer.  You will not lose 
any benefits or rights you would normally have if you choose not to volunteer.  You can stop at any time 
during the study and still keep the benefits and rights you had before volunteering.    
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE? 
There are no costs associated with taking part in the study. 
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
You will not receive any rewards or payment for taking part in the study. 
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE? 
We will make every effort to keep private all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by 
law. 
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we 
write about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we 
have gathered. You will not be personally identified in these written materials. We may publish the results 
of this study; however, we will keep your name and specific identifying information private. In the final 
document the only identifying information that will be used is your role/former role and the type of 
institution you work/worked for, i.e. Associate General Counsel at a large public university.  
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave 
us information, or what that information is. The recordings will be maintained on an encrypted server until 
the completion of the study. Transcripts of the interviews will be maintained in text form without personal 
identification and will be destroyed six years after the successful defense of the dissertation.   
We will keep private all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by law.  However, there are 
some circumstances in which we may have to show your information to other people.  Also, we may be 
required to show information which identifies you to people who need to be sure we have done the research 
correctly; these would be people from such organizations as the University of Kentucky. 
CAN YOUR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY? 
If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you no longer want 
to continue.  You will not be treated differently if you decide to stop taking part in the study.  The 
individuals conducting the study may need to withdraw you from the study.  This may occur if you are not 
able to follow the directions they give you, if they find that your being in the study is more risk than benefit 
to you, or if the agency funding the study decides to stop the study early for a variety of scientific reasons.   
WHAT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, CONCERNS, OR COMPLAINTS? 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that 
might come to mind now.  Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the 
study, you can contact the investigator, Jason Block, at 919-962-7989.  If you have any questions about 
your rights as a volunteer in this research, contact the staff in the Office of Research Integrity at the 
University of Kentucky at 859-257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-400-9428.  We will give you a signed copy of 
this consent form to take with you.  
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_________________________________________ ____________ 
Signature of person agreeing to take part in the study Date 
_________________________________________ 
Printed name of person agreeing to take part in the study 
_________________________________________  ____________ 
Name of [authorized] person obtaining informed consent Date 
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1. Please describe how you became interested in practicing law?
2. Please describe how you came into the role of a General Counsel for a higher education
institution?
3. Please describe what you see as the modern day role(s) of the University
Counsel/University Counsel’s Office on a college or university campus?
4. With as much or as little detail as you feel comfortable sharing, can you provide me with
an example of how you fit into that role?
5. How do you think other University administrators view/viewed the role of the Counsel’s
Office?
6. With as much or as little detail as you feel comfortable sharing, can you provide me
with an example of how that view impacted interactions between the OGC and the
departments/offices?
7. What are the greatest challenges you faced as a GC?
8. With as much or as little detail as you feel comfortable sharing, can you provide me with
an example(s) of how you overcame those challenges?
9. How do you think practicing in a college or university environment differs from
practicing in private practice? As in-house counsel at a for profit entity?
10. Why do you think Offices of General Counsel have grown in size and scope in the past 30
or so years?
11. Where do you see the in-house practice of law on college and university campuses going
in the next 20-30 years?
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